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Preassignments of Creators' Rights:
An Adhesion Analysis
By PAUL GELLER
A.B., University of Chicago; M.A. Brandeis University; JD., University of
Southern California; Member, California Bar.*
An employee creates, invents or somehow innovates. Who-he or
his employer-may exercise rights in using, disclosing and profiting
from his product of mind?' The answer most often turns on whether,
while creating, the employee was laboring under a pre-assignment,
that is, the prospective conveyance of legal interests in his creation.2
The employer can claim, in many instances, that upon hire the
employee expressly promised to assign to the employing enterprise
all rights and interests in any eventual product of mind he origi-
nated on the job or, alternatively, that the employee's status in the
enterprise warrants implying an equivalent promise. The courts,
however, in mechanically enforcing preassignment claims, can eas-
ily ignore whether an employee freely assented to the contractual
language or employment status on which such claims are based.3
Fraud, duress and mistake are the traditionally recognized defects
in assent which would justify withholding enforcement, although
the standardization of contractual forms and modern employment
practices have given rise to a more subtle defect in assent, namely,
the absence of reasonable alternatives otherwise known as adhe-
sion.' It shall here be argued that constitutionally based policies
which justify securing exclusive rights to creators require that the
* The author wishes to thank Ira Moskatel for his help at the very first stages of
"brainstorming" the ideas for this article, and Tom McCoy for his encouragement and edi-
torial guidance in putting it into final form.
1. "Product of mind," rather than "intellectual property," will be used in this article as a
generic term for all such works and inventions, as well as for ideas upon which they are based.
This usage follows the chapter heading for Sections 980-985 of the California Civil Code. Cf.
International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250-51 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 35 Cal. 2d 653, 673-75, 221 P.2d 75
(1950) (Traynor, J., dissenting). Both Brandeis and Traynor, in their dissents, explain that
it is conclusory to speak of "property" rights in the fruits of intellectual labor unless some
statute applies to secure such rights.
2. See Part I, infra, for hypothetical illustrating how such a conveyance can be asserted.
3. See Part II, infra, for present law governing preassignment claims.
4. See Parts IV and, V, infra, for an exposition of adhesion analysis and its proposed
application to preassignment claims.
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courts strictly scrutinize preassignments for adhesion and related
defects in notice.'
I. The Creator's Dilemma
How does a preassignment operate? The following hypothetical
will illustrate how an employee might typically become subject to
a preassignment.1 It will also show how the employer may assert the
preassignment once the employee's creation is disclosed.
A draftsman is offered employment. The personnel director inter-
viewing him hands him a standard form setting forth certain provi-
sions concerning "all designs, ideas, inventions or improvements"
that the draftsman might "conceive during . . . employment."I
Among the standard provisions he might find, on a close reading,
are a commitment to "disclose" any novel conception "promptly"
to, the employing enterprise, a promise to refrain from making such
disclosure to any third party before the employer makes the concep-
tion "public," an acknowledgement that any resulting products of
mind are the employer's "sole property," and a promise to execute
assignments and other necessary papers to that effect.'
The draftsman is not being hired as an artist, nor as a researcher,
but merely as a technical aid. In scanning his employment contract,
the draftsman might altogether fail to focus on the preassignment
provisions, or he might simply assume, if he takes note of the provi-
sions, that there would be no occasion to apply them to his own
noncreative job function.? Perhaps he might ask the personnel direc-
tor hiring him what the preassignment language means or how it
applies to him in particular, and the personnel director might well
respond that the whole contract is a standard form signed upon hire
as a matter of course and that he has no authority to vary or waive
5. See Parts III and V, infra, for an analysis of these policies, their preemptive character
and consequences.
6. This hypothetical is a composite of various cases which are discussed in the text accom-
panying notes 46-59 and 63-74 infra.
7. Such clauses are widely used in industry. See O'MEARA, EMPLOYEE PATENT AND SECRECY
AGREEMENTS, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD STUDY IN PERSONNEL POLICY No. 199,
21 (1965) [hereinafter cited as O'MEARA]. See also F. NEUMEYER, THE EMPLOYED INVENTOR
IN THE UNITED STATES (1971) [hereinafter cited as NEUMEYER].
8. For these and further examples of such contract language, see OMEARA, supra note 7,
at 21, 35, 75 et seq.; NEUMEYER, supra note 7 at 156-59.
9. Relevant terms may not be set forth on the instrument at all, as when bonus and award
plans associated with preassignment have limited applications not spelled out in the original
contract form. See NEUMEYER, supra note 7, at 152-54. In addition job descriptions in the
corporate setting often do not clearly denote whether a job function is to be creative. Id.
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the language in question. 0 Sometime after being hired, the drafts-
man is transferred into products development, an event which could
have the same legal consequences as the standard form preassign-
ment language purports to impose."
While drafting plans for designers in products development, the
draftsman has an idea for a less expensive, more aesthetically pleas-
ing, and stronger structure than any previously proposed design.
The draftsman has a number of options at this point. He could
simply fail to take the pains of developing his idea into detailed
plans since, having signed away all rights to any eventual creation
when hired, he could expect no further compensation for his plans,
at least not from his employer. 2 He could, in accordance with the
disclosure provisions of his employment contract, submit plans for
his novel design to the department head of products development,
who might tell him that the idea would be carefully examined. If,
however, he chose not to disclose or the company took no immediate
action on his proposal, he could fix his name and a copyright notice
10. Not only may the hiring agent have no authority to vary the term, but the employer
may have precluded any possibility of negotiating a more limited preassignment by including
the term in a standard form employment contract which was then ratified as a whole through
collective bargaining. For a discussion of standard form "minimum" contracts which creators'
unions have established in the entertainment industry, see D. FARBER & P. BAUMGARTEN,
PRODUCING, FINANCING AND DISTRIBUTING FILM 20-21, 24-25, 164-65 (1973). For an analysis of
reasons why many unions do not pursue favorable standard terms respecting creator's rights
and, in particular, patents, see Sutton & Williams, The Case for the Moss Bill, 8 U.S.F. L.
REV. 557, 574 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Sutton & Williame]. See also O'MEARA, supra note
7, at 62-65; NEUMEYER, supra note 7, at 163 et seq.
11. Such transfer may trigger the so-called doctrine of the "writer-for-hire" or "creator-for-
hire." See text accompanying notes 46-61 infra. For the law applicable to the former, see 1
M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT, 238.1 et seq. (1975) [hereinafter cited as NIMME]. For a general
statement of the law applicable to the latter, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 397
(1957).
12. This is the least visible, but by no means the least significant option for the present
argument. The creator who follows this path of least resistance will not have occasion to ask
a court to determine the legitimacy of his employer's preassignment claims and his case will
thus not appear in the appellate opinions. Nonetheless, it displays disincentives to develop
and disclose innovation that contravene policies which underlie copyright and patent law. See
text accompanying notes 125-37 infra.
13. Where an employer has clearly rejected an employee's proposed creation, the employer
may be estopped from claiming rights to the creation by preassignment. Cf. Maurice A.
Garbell, Inc. v. Consolidated Vultee A. Corp., 94 F. Supp. 843, 845-46 (S.D. Cal. 1950)
("rejection . . . unconditional and unequivocal" constituted an alternative ground for estop-
pel); Banner Metals, Inc. v. Lockwood, 178 Cal. App. 2d 643, 660-61, 3 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1960)
(rejection less clear but sufficient to allow estoppel). However, where the rejection is not clear
but rather, as here, a kind of noncommittal acceptance, the employer retains a certain
latitude, on the basis of its claims to the innovation, to develop it into a viable product of
mind or simply shelve it. See text accompanying note 139 infra.
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on his plans, register them with the Registrar of Copyrights, and
also apply for both a design patent and a patent."
Nevertheless, the preassignment, whether express or implied from
his job function, places the draftsman in a dilemma. Whatever
course of action he follows in developing and disclosing his idea, his
employer can raise claims of preassignment to preclude him from
profiting from his creative work. On the one hand, if the draftsman
did disclose his design to his employer, who in turn used it without
compensating him above and beyond his salary, the draftsman
could find himself barred from suing to enjoin such use or to obtain
an accounting of resultant profits or royalties. There are remedies
for the infringement of common law and statutory rights in products
of mind; but the employer, pleading the preassignment as a defense,
could maintain that it cannot infringe the very rights which it holds
by virtue of that conveyance.'" On the other hand, if the draftsman
disclosed and attempted to assign his interests in his design to a
third party, he could become subject to liability on many fronts. His
original employer could sue for specific performance of his promise
upon hire to assign all rights in products of mind he conceived on
the job, as well as for an accounting for use of the product to date."
14. The draftsman has applied for every available statutory protection for his design idea.
The hypothetical was thus constructed to illustrate the many facets of products of mind for
which legal protection might be obtained. Creation in a tangible form, with or without
copyright notice, now suffices to establish a copyright. 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-06 (1977). The creator
secures the right to sue for copyright infringement by registering and depositing his work with
the Registrar of Copyrights. 17 U.S.C. §§ 407-12 (1977). Still it is doubtful whether a creator,
after copyrighting plans, may sue another for infringement upon unauthorized implementa-
tion of the plans in an object to be sold at a profit. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 11, at 95-98,
120. See also Myers, Industrial Protection of Preproduction Disclosures, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
783, 788 et seq. (1967). There remain other means of protection. A design patent would allow
a suit for such implementation of the decorative aspects of the design in an object. 35 U.S.C.
H§ 171-73 (1976). Prior or simultaneous copyright would not preclude design patent protec-
tion. See Application of Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974). A patent as a "manufacture"
would protect any structural innovation in the design. See generally P. ROSENBERG, PATENT
LAW FUNDAMENTALS 77-80 (1975).
15. If the preassignment were valid, it would alienate the creator's right to sue for infringe-
ment of any common law rights or statutory copyrights and patents which he could claim in
his product of mind. Thus, as in cases such as Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d
497 (2d Cir. 1969), discussed in text accompanying notes 46-51 infra, the creator would be
barred from such suit and corresponding remedies. For remedies for infringement of creator's
rights generally, see D. Doses, REMEDIES, 434-58, 495-503 (1973). For remedies for copyright
infringement, see 1 NIMMER, supra note 11, at 666 et seq.; 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1959). For remedies
for patent infringement, see NAVIN, PATENTS 51-52 (Rev. ed. 1966); 35 U.S.C. §§ 281 et seq.
(1976).
16. The preassignment is, strictly speaking, a promise to assign which, once a product of
mind is created under it, is specifically enforceable. Also a court may find an equitable
interest in the assignee as of the date of creation, but prior to the order of specific perform-
4 Comm/ENT [Vol. 2
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Further, since the draftsman's communication to a third party
would breach his obligation to disclose to his employer exclusively
or, absent such a term, would represent a liberty taken with prop-
erty arguably not his, he could be answerable in damages for his
communication, as well as for the release of a trade secret. 7
In short, the employee's options in developing, disclosing and
marketing his own creation are limited by whatever preassignment
his employer may assert on the basis of his terms of hire. Ultimately,
this raises the issue of whether a court should enforce the preassign-
ment or hold it invalid.
II. The Uncertain Trend of the Law
Judges in the last century considered preassignments with suspi-
cion as imposing a "mortgage on a man's mind."" Would a court
today nonetheless fully enforce the very broad preassignment terms
which the employer could assert in the foregoing hypothetical
against the eventually creative employee? Quite possibly it would,
for currently applied precedent displays no consistent and critical
approach to the increasing use of standard form preassignments in
industry, nor to claims that equivalent terms should be inferred
from unbargained-for job functions.0 Thus, as will be shown, the
case law no longer precludes employers from imposing such preas-
signments without negotiation or other guarantees of assent on em-
ployees who are not hired or compensated specifically to create.
A. The Traditional Approach to Claims of Preassignment
To understand how the law has become uncertain, it is necessary
to examine the approach which the courts took toward preassign-
ments at the turn of the century. Traditionally, terms of hire deter-
mined the obligations of an employee to his employer; but, without
ance. See Bishop, Employers, Employees and Inventions, 31 S. CAL. L. REV. 38, 56-58 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as BishopJ.
17. Le., if the preassignment makes the creation into the "property" of the employer, this
conveyance of right can be effective only if in effect it allows suit for unauthorized disclosure.
See text accompanying notes 97-115 infra. This argument is usually made superfluous by the
practice of coupling promises to assign with promises to disclose ideas promptly to the em-
ployer and to maintain same and related information secret from others. See O'MEARA, supra
note 8, at 14-15, 27-29.
18. Aspinwall Mfg. Co. v. Gill, 32 F. 697, 700 (D.N.J. 1887) (dictum).
19. For a summary of current law, see the following authorities: 1 NIMMER, supra note 11,
at 238.1 et seq; Stedman, Employer-Employee Relations, in NEUMEYER, supra note 7, at 29
et seq.; Bishop, supra note 16.
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any fully articulated rationale, the courts distinguished between
"an employment to make an invention" and "a general employment
in the course of which the servant conceives an invention."21 The
early cases at least made clear that only when a creator accepted
employment to develop specified products of mind was he to be
deemed an "artist" or "inventor-for-hire" obligated to assign to his
employer his rights in those products.2 ' Difficulties arose, however,
in drawing the line between such specific employment to create and
mere general employment, upon which no preassignment claim
could be based.
Previously courts could draw this line after reviewing the full
context of employment to determine whether there was a negotiated
basis for the preassignment claims being asserted. Illustrative of
this approach is Dalzell v. Dueber Manufacturing Company,"2 in
which the Supreme Court carefully reconstructed discussions be-
tween a machinist and the owner of a small factory prior and subse-
quent to hire. It was admitted that the machinist initially accepted
employment to make certain improvements in the manufacturing
process of the factory, but a dispute arose concerning the employer's
claims to other inventions which he subsequently conceived on the
job.23 The Court, after a close review of the evidence, refused to
enforce the employer's preassignment claims because he did not
meet his burden of showing that the machinist's initial terms of hire
clearly included, or were mutually understood to include, the subse-
quent inventions. 24
The Court in Dalzell gave as ultimate grounds for refusing such
enforcement the principle that only well-evidenced terms of hire
should be granted specific performance.25 But the Court, in its
painstaking evidentiary analysis, also asked whether the employer
proved not only the meaning and scope of the preassignment which
he claimed, but free assent by the employee to the terms on which
such claims were based. More particularly, it found it unlikely, in
20. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp. 289 U.S. 178, 191-92 (1933).
21. See, e.g., Dielman v. White, 102 F. 892 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900), holding that, absent
express reservation of the power to copyright, the designer of a mosaic had relinquished his
right to sue for copyright infringement to the party commissioning his work; Standard Parts
Co. v. Peck, 264 U.S. 52 (1924), holding that an inventor specifically hired and paid a bonus
to develop a manufacturing process had effectively transferred all his patent rights to his
original employer.
22. 149 U. S. 315 (1893).
23. Id. at 320.
24. Id. at 321-25.
25. Id. at 326.
6 [Vol. 2
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the absence of independent consideration, that the machinist as-
sented well after hire to any agreement to develop the inventions at
issue." The Supreme Court subsequently suggested in United
States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.21 that the rationale for this in-
quiry into assent goes beyond that for any showing required for the
equitable remedy of specific performance. The Court stated: "The
reluctance of courts to imply or infer an agreement by the employee
to assign his patent is due to a recognition of the particular nature
of the act of invention. . . 2 Creation in general is a contingency
difficult to anticipate outside of a specific project to create a work
of art, solve given technical problems, or pursue a line of research. ,
Whether or not it is this contingent aspect of the creative act that
the Supreme Court was talking about in Dubilier, such contingency
helps make sense of the distinction which the Court there relies
upon in reaching its decision. On the one hand, the Court talks of
specific employment "to make an invention," a situation in which
both employer and employee would know the scope of the creative
activity and could bargain cogently with respect to allocating rights
in foreseeably resulting products of mind.30 This is different, on the
other hand, from "general" employment where the servant, before
the fact of creation, could not meaningfully assent to relinquishing
whatever interests might arise in unanticipated innovation. In
Dubilier in particular, research scientists who were employed by the
Bureau of Standards to solve problems in radio technology used
Bureau facilities to invent unexpected improvements in that tech-
nology. In the face of the allegation that their inventions fell "within
the general field of their research," the lower court found that the
scientists "did not agree to exercise their inventive faculties in their
work."" The Supreme Court thereupon held against alienating the
scientists' patents.
Some courts have continued to follow the seminal cases in the
restrictive approach to preassignment claims. But, before enforcing
or refusing to enforce such claims on the basis of terms of hire, these
26. Id. at 323.
27. 289 U.S. 178 (1933).
28. Id. at 188.
29. See generally A. KoESTLER, THE Acr or CREATION (1964).
30. 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933), stating: "The reason is that he has only produced that which
he was employed to invent. His invention is the precise subject of the contract of employ-
ment." (Emphasis added.)
31. Id. at 193.
32. Id. at 195-96, reiterating its rationale: "In no proper sense may it be said that the
contract of employment contemplated invention. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
No. 1] 7
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courts had such facts to look to as closely negotiated clauses of the
employment contract or actual negotiations with the employer him -
self, from which the presence or absence of underlying bargain could
be ascertained. Thus in Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 3
a sponsor employed a radio star to perform using scripts he would
furnish himself. The employment contract, however, did not state
whether he would write such scripts himself or hire a writer for this
purpose. The court found no more than a contract to perform and
therefore no preassignment of copyrights in the scripts, interpreting
the provision to pay the star an extra $1,500 if he furnished scripts,
not as consideration for his writing them, but possibly as intending
to help him purchase them." In Cahill v. Regan" a plant manager
had an idea for a reusable can and spoke of it to his employer who
told him to "go ahead" and develop the idea. The manager per-
fected the idea into an invention, but he received no further com-
pensation. The court refused to find and enforce preassignment of
patents implicit in this "go ahead," reasoning that it was both un-
supported by consideration for invention and beyond the scope of
an originally non-inventive job function."
To summarize, in the foregoing cases the courts were presented
with ample evidence of negotiations of terms of hire and subsequent
circumstances on the job. There was thus available a factual basis
for determining whether there was assent to employment to create
specific products of mind, without which no claim of preassignment
of rights in such products would be enforced.
B. The Current Pattern of Enforcement of
Preassignments
The point here is not merely that the courts have forgotten prod-
ucts development departments and research teams, or now ignore
the seminal cases on preassignments. The problem is deeper. At
present, courts are asked to enforce preassignments in employment
situations in which negotiation is altogether absent and in which
preassignment clauses themselves rarely cover specific creations but
are rather cast in blanket terms.37 Thus the factual context in which
33. 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1936).
34. Id. at 376.
35. 4 App. Div. 2d 328, 165 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1957), aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d 292, 184 N.Y.S.2d 348,
157 N.E.2d 505 (1959).
36. Id. at 330-31, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 128-29.
37. See Stedman, The Employee-Inventor, The Public Interest, and Horse and Buggy Law
in the Space Age, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1, 16-22 (1970).
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the traditionally restrictive approach to preassignment claims was
developed has changed radically, and modern courts often adjudi-
cate such claims in situations in which no counterpart to this ap-
proach has been fashioned or adapted. This change, it shall be seen,
has resulted in a pattern of enforcement which tends to alienate
creators' rights without any threshold showing of assent.
1. The Transformation in the Employment of Creative
Power-
Since the turn of the century, there have been thorough-going
changes in the employment of potentially creative manpower. From
the nineteenth to the twentieth century, artistic, technical and sci-
entific creation became increasingly specialized and industrial-
ized.18 Impersonal corporate entities were organized to capitalize
this process and administer the large-scale facilities it required.
Trained and talented workers no longer found themselves in small
workshops, but rather in large media studios, products development
departments, and research teams.3 ' Thus the intimate workshop
setting found in the seminal cases, in which employees could negoti-
ate face to face with their employers concerning job function and
pay, has been supplanted by standardized hiring procedures and
terms. 0 As a result of this transformation, courts no longer have
access to the traditional factual context, such as negotiations and
specific terms of hire, with which to approach preassignment claims
restrictively.
At the same time, this transformation in the employment context
makes situations as depicted by the introductory hypothetical occur
with increasing frequency. First, corporate employers hire much
potentially creative manpower, not through immediate negotiations
with principals capable of binding the employer contractually, but
through agents such as personnel managers who have no actual
38. See B. EDELMAN, LE Daorr SAISI PAR LA PHOTOGRAPHIE Ch. 3 (1973), analyzing the
questions which the industrialization of the graphic arts, through the invention of photogra-
phy, presented to nineteenth century jurisprudence.
39. See Kresilovsky, Motivation and Control of Creative Writing, in THE MOVIE BUSINESS:
AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY PRACTICE 40-41 (A. Bluem & J. Squire, eds. 1972); Ruben,
Imaginative Thinking and Opportunities Afforded an Independent Developer by the Ameri-
can Patent System 49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 442, 454-57 (1967).
40. Cf. O'MEARA, supra note 7, at 18, Table 1 at 11 (indicating the number of enterprises
studied by field) and Table 5 at 22 (indicating the frequency of standard form terms among
all the enterprises studied). O'Meara does not correlate kinds of enterprise to terms used, but
81 out of 86 enterprises studied used blanket disclosure and preassignment terms rather than
allow for negotiation relative to creators' rights.
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authority to vary predetermined terms of hire." Second, once em-
ployed by the corporation, employees are often shifted from one
department to another according to the immediate organizational
needs of production or development, so that the employment pack-
age, namely job function, corresponding obligations, and compensa-
tion acquired upon hire, may later change without warning or
choice." Third, these employers generally use standard form em-
ployment contracts which, for artists, technicians and scientists,
and frequently for workers in non-creative positions, almost univer-
sally include preassignment clauses which are often cast in blanket
terms. 3 In short, a preassignment asserted under such circumstan-
ces may well be based on invariable terms, in which an employee
has little alternative but to acquiesce, and to which his job function
bears no reasonable relation-all of which suggests the absence of
effective assent."
2. Change of Job Function as Grounds for Preassign-
ment
The decisions at the turn of the century dealt with cases in which
employers had asked the courts to infer preassignments from the
fact and terms of hire. Whether or not such a term was enforced did
not turn on the presence of special contractual language, but rather
on evidence of specifically creative employment. Modern circum-
stances have presented a new twist in the general problem of basing
a preassignment on terms of hire, whether these include express
preassignment provisions or not. This twist is found in the recurrent
case where an employee originally hired to perform a non-creative
job function is transferred into a department in which he, either
under order or by accident, participates in creative or research ac-
tivities and ultimately generates his own innovative ideas." Here
41. See Stedman, Rights and Responsibilities of the Employed Inventor, 45 IND. L.J. 254,
258-59 (1970).
42. Cf. NEUMEYER, supra note 7, at 154, (observing that although preassignment is theoreti-
cally reasonable for employees clearly hired "to invent and develop," "[in practical in-
dustrial life there are many equivocal categories," and proposing that preassignment be
"[Ilimited to the field in which the employee is actually intended to work at the time of
employment.")
43. See O'MEARA, supra note 7, at chs. 3 and 4; NEUMEYER, supra note 7, at 158, proposing
that contracts avoid "[bIlanket provisions covering assignment of all inventions made by
an employee."
44. I.e., due to adhesion and/or inadequate notice. See text accompanying notes 154-90
infra.
45. This changes the situation relative to the facts in the seminal case of Dalzell v. Dueber
Match Mfg. Co., discussed in the text accompanying notes 22-25 supra. In that case, the
original terms of hire reasonably justified transferring rights to initial inventions developed
10 Coum/ENT [Vol. 2
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the courts have failed to develop a consistent response that takes
account of the creator's assent.
In Scherr v. Universal Match Corporation," the Second Circuit
was called upon to find a preassignment purportedly implicit in a
change of military duties. The majority found that two soldiers, who
initially were illustrators at Fort Dix, had preassigned all copyrights
to their employer, the Army, by building a statue under the orders
of the Fort Commander." Dissenting Justice Friendly, observing
that the soldiers had no other alternative but the draft and enlist-
ment, challenged the tacit assumption of the District Court that the
soldiers freely assented to whatever task the Army gave them, much
less that of creating the statue. 8 The majority answered this point
by asserting:
[P]laintiffs here did possess some bargaining power. They were
not required to engage in the work they did in order to fulfill their
military obligations; they did so voluntarily. In all probability they
were glad to be relieved of their regular duties and welcomed the
opportunity to be engaged in work more akin to their artistic tal-
ents."9
Even assuming that the soldiers built the statue to be "relieved of
their regular duties", the court's speculation that "in all probability
they . . . welcomed the opportunity" does not suffice to establish
assent to any preassignment, especially for the purpose of affirming
a summary judgment against them."0 Justice Friendly pointed out
a fact in the record that would allow contrary inferences: plaintiffs
claim to have spent some 1,950 hours of valuable leisure time on the
statue." That allegation, if true, could mean either that their crea-
tive effort was gratuitous and not in the line of compensated em-
ployment, or else that it was not made freely but under the pressure
of military authority. In neither event can it be automatically in-
ferred that the soldiers were ready to relinquish copyright claims.
by the employee, but did not specifically cover certain subsequent inventions, the rights to
which the employee therefore retained. The situation encountered all too often in modern
cases such as those discussed below, is that of the employee who is hired in a noncreative
capacity, i.e., on terms from which no preassignment may be implied, and then is transferred
into a research laboratory.
46. 417 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1969), aff'g 297 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), cert. den., 397
U.S. 396 (1970). For an analysis of the problem posed by the applicable sections of the
Copyright Act, see text accompanying notes 88-92 infra.
47. Id. at 501.
48. Id. at 502-03.
49. Id. at 501.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 503.
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The military context in Scherr admittedly makes its facts unique.
It is in highly compartmentalized industrial contexts that employ-
ers most often shift employees from one job function to another. But
the dissent in Scherr highlighted the hitherto unclarified require-
ment that free assent is needed, not simply to initial terms of hire,
but to any changes in such terms from which a preassignment might
be implied. In Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Fankhanel ,52 a federal
district court simply ignored any possible defect in assent at the
point at which a young worker was made a technical assistant in a
research department and given the task of helping develop a prod-
uct. The court chose to find that he impliedly preassigned his patent
claims when his original terms of hire were changed by his transfer
rather than rely on the express preassignment clause which he had
signed upon hire as a minor. 3 In dictum, though, the court asserted
that the employee would have been bound by the express clause as
well since he did not disavow it upon reaching the age of contractual
competence." But there was no evidence that the employee had any
more choice in not questioning the cliuse upon turning twenty-one
than in accepting terms arguably implicit in his job function.
Rather, after perfecting his invention, the employee requested an
increase in salary and, that failing, a share in patent royalties, but
his bargaining power did not match his demands, which were subse-
quently refused.55
Not only have courts neglected employees' effective alternatives
upon transfer to nominally creative job functions, they have failed
to inquire into whether the employee could reasonably expect to be
subject to a subsequent preassignment upon accepting originally
non-creative employment. Justice Friendly observed in Scherr that
the government ordered the soldiers to build the statue without
indicating that it required a copyright, which the soldiers then ap-
plied for in their own name." In industrial cases, the courts some-
times overlook the distinction between, on the one hand, transfer
into research and development to perform and receive compensation
for purely technical work and, on the other hand, transfer accompa-
52. 49 F. Supp. 611 (D. Md. 1943).
53. Id. at 619: "Since we conclude that the plaintiff must prevail in the present case,
independently of the contract between it and the defendant [i.e., the express preassign-
ment), it is not necessary to consider the effect of that contract." But see Bishop, supra note
16, at 55-56, who cites Crown Cork in support of the proposition that "intracompany transfers
of the employee have no effect on the agreement."
54. Id. at 619-20.
55. Id. at 614.
56. 417 F.2d 497, 502-03 (2d Cir. 1969) (dissent).
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nied by the status and emoluments of creative work. Thus in Crown
Cork"7 the young inventor became a technical assistant to a senior
member of the research staff; and, in the later case of Forberg v.
Servel, Inc.,"8 an immigrant technician was hired as a "staff mem-
ber" of a testing laboratory, then directed to help in solving a prob-
lem without any increase in pay. The courts enforcing preassign-
ments in both cases relied on the fact of employment in a research
laboratory, but did not ask whether an employee being paid to
perform assistantship functions could reasonably expect to be sub-
ject to preassignment terms as might their superiors."
It cannot be presumed that an employee, once integrated into the
employing organization, has any real alternative other than mere
acquiescence in a directive to change job function. Yet courts still
assert that an employee, "though not initially employed for the
purpose of exercising his inventive ability," if "thereafter directed
to devote his talents to that end," preassigns his creators' rights
when he is shifted to ostensibly creative or research-related tasks.,"
In so doing, these courts ignore the fact that the master-servant
relationship often puts the employee in a weaker bargaining position
frcm which he can hardly negotiate effectively over the allocation
of creators' rights such as might arise in performing his new job
function.
3. The Use and Abuse of the Standard Form
Preassignment
Often artists and scientists, in bargaining ahead of time for terms
of hire, are able to have express preassignment language tailored to
a particular area of creation or research. Courts still construe such
negotiated language restrictively, reserving to the creator rights in
all products of mind that do not clearly fall within the agreed-upon
area.' But no critical judicial approach has been developed to stan-
57. 49 F. Supp. 611, 612 (D. Md. 1943).
58. 88 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
59. See id. at 505, 507. In this case, the court ruled that under an implied preassignment
the employee was obligated to execute an assignment of patents, which he had done "freely
and voluntarily." But this reasoning misplaces the question of effective assent which should
be addressed to the terms of hire from which the preassignment was implied.
60. Pursche v. Atlas Scraper and Eng'r. Co., 300 F.2d 467, 484-95 (9th Cir. 1962), citing
Forberg.
61. See De Long Corp. v. Lucas, 278 F.2d 804, 808-09 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 364 U.S. 833
(1960) (negotiated preassignment limited in effect to specified inventions). See also New
Britain Machine v. Yeo, 358 F.2d 397, 405-08 (6th Cir. 1966) (preassignment not extended to
improvements).
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dard form contracts with preassignment provisions covering all
employee creations irrespective of original job area, function or com-
pensation. The courts usually enforce these potentially overreaching
form contracts by jumping over the threshold question of assent,
reasoning that employment itself is adequate consideration for sign-
ing the forms." The exceptional cases examined here will prove the
rule that such provisions are sufficiently enforceable across the
board to allow their widespread use.
Courts have occasionally construed away objectionably over-
reaching language in express preassignments, but without systemat-
ically focusing on underlying defects in assent. In Rotary Lift Com-
pany v. Clayton," an engineering student, who had invented an
improved elevator valve while hired as a technician, was told that
if he did not sign a blanket preassignment as written he would have
difficulty finding employment elsewhere. The court found that the
standard form preassignment language covering all "future" inven-
tions was ambiguous in its application to the new valve which the
employee invented before he signed the form, and, construing that
language against the employer who provided the form, held it in-
applicable." The court, however, did not consider significant the
coercive tactics by which the employer obtained the signature of the
form contract, that is, the employee's lack of alternatives to signing.
This would have been grounds for refusing to enforce the form lan-
guage even if it were not ambiguous.
Another example of close construction is found in James bury Cor-
poration v. Worcester Value Company." The employer relied on
contract language purporting to give it all rights to "inventions"
developed on the job, while the ex-employee argued that this lan-
guage did not apply to his innovative "conceptions" but only to
inventions made operative while at work." The court found the
standard form language at issue to be ambiguous and, noting in
passing that the employer had the employee sign the standard form
62. See Patent & Licensing Corp. v. Olsen, 188 F.2d 522, 525 (2d Cir. 1951) (employment
adequate consideration); Maloney v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 352 F.2d 936, 939-40
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (employment, consideration for preassignment, may not be terminated with-
out cause).
63. 127 F. Supp. 176, 177-78 (D. Mass. 1954).
64. Id. at 178-79.
65. 443 F.2d 205, 213 (1st Cir. 1971), aff'g 318 F. Supp. 1 (D. Mass. 1979), discussed in
Doherty & landiorio, The Law of the Employed Inventor-Time for a Change? 57 MASS. L.Q.
27 (1972).
66. Id. at 210-13.
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upon graduation and entry into the firm, construed the ambiguous
provisions against the form provider to avoid their application."7
The recent case of Hewett v. Samsonite Corporation" invalidated
a standard form assignment for lack of consideration, but the case
could have been decided on grounds of ineffective assent. There the
foreman of the shop in which prototypes were made and tested
helped create new features and models, but his employer required
that he sign over to the company each patent which he received in
these features." Asking what consideration he would receive, he was
told: "Well, you have a job with the company, haven't you?" Then,
after being laid off work, the foreman's receipt of termination pay
was made conditional on his signing a general release of all claims
on his inventions on the job.7" The court struck down both the as-
signments and the general release, rejecting the employer's
"contention that continuation of employment, such employment
already having been mutually bargained for, is sufficient considera-
tion to support an assignment of invention or patent rights."7' An
analysis of the foreman's alternatives to the assignments and ulti-
mate release renders his apparent assent to them suspect in that his
choice finally came down to either relinquishing his creators' claims
of right or accepting unemployment without termination pay.n
Hewett, although an assignment and release case ultimately de-
cided on grounds of inadequate consideration, puts issues underly-
ing defective assent, which are present in the frequent imposition
of preassignment claims, into sharp relief. Where the signing of a
standard form preassignment is made a condition of employment,
the absence of alternatives and consequent effect on bargaining
power depends on the relative frequency with which such clauses are
used .7 Further, cases arise where, as in job transfer situations, em-
ployees find creators' rights alienated on terms to which their agree-
ment upon hire gave no warning. 4 Finally, since a preassignment
67. Id. By stopping short of the issue of contractual assent, the Jamesbury court left the
thrust of its attack on the standard form without subsequent judicial impact. See Steranko
v. Inforex, Inc., 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 446, 362 N.E.2d 222, 234 n.16 (1977).
68. 32 Colo. App. 150, 507 P.2d 1119 (1973).
69. 507 P.2d at 1120-21.
70. Id.
71. 507 P.2d at 1121.
72. Id.
73. See notes 7 and 40 supra.
74. See notes 9 and 42 supra. See, e.g., Du Pont Rayon Co. v. Paley, 4 F. Supp. 290, 292-
93 (N.D. Ill. 1933) (no fraud where preassignment includes bonus plan with eligibility terms
not disclosed to employee).
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limited to one field might be construed narrowly, the employer will
try to expand the scope of his preassignment claims with a clause
written in blanket terms covering all products of mind, especially
those qualifying for statutory protection." Such blanket clauses vio-
late the standard of specificity that seminal law requires of terms
of hire upon which a preassignment may be based because they are
susceptible to application without any reasonable relation to job
function."
In summary, circumstances of employment have changed radi-
cally since the turn of the century. Employees, whether or not hired
to create, find themselves either constrained to sign standard form
preassignments upon hire, or transferred into job functions from
which preassignment can arguably be inferred, but without any
chance to renegotiate terms of hire. How have the courts responded?
By mechanically enforcing claims of preassignment based on stan-
dard form terms or job function without any systematic analysis of
underlying defects in assent. Even in the exceptional cases, where
courts have construed away over-reaching preassignment lan-
guage," the issues pertinent to assent have at best been broached,
without becoming grounds for decision.
III. Rights and Policies at Stake
It can and should be asked whether the case law just discussed is
the sole authority dispositive of the questions raised here. This ques-
tion can be reformulated in terms of the arguable preemption of
state preassignment law by the federal policies that the United
States Constitution effectuates in its so-called Authors and Inven-
tors Clause." It is true that state law governs the threshold issue of
enforceability of the agency and contractual relations on the basis
of which preassignments of creators' rights are claimed." Nonethe-
less, in the light of the presumptive character of the policies under-
lying federal grants of such rights as patents, one commentator has
suggested that preassignments be made directly subject to a federal
common law.80 It shall be seen that preemption case law would allow
75. See notes 40, 43 and 61 supra.
76. See text accompanying notes 20-36 supra.
77. See text accompanying notes 63-67 supra.
78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
79. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 11, at 567-69: Chisum, The Allocation of Jurisdiction Be-
tween State and Federal Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 WASH. L. REv. 633, 645-47 (1971).
80. See Orkin, The Legal Rights of the Employed Inventor: New Approaches to Old Prob-
lems (Part 11-Conclusion), 56 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'k 719, 722-27 (1974), who contends that
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conveyances of creators' rights to be adjudicated under state law,
while limiting their enforcement when it threatens to undercut fed-
eral policies.
A. Federal Limits to the Enforcement of Preassignments
In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins' the Supreme Court held that California
could not apply the purely contractual estoppel principles to pre-
vent a licensee of all rights in a new gyroscope device from challeng-
ing the validity of patents for which the licensor had applied. The
Court reasoned that licensees should be able to raise the defense of
such invalidity just as could accused infringers in order to maximize
the chances for keeping the patent monopoly within the limits dic-
tated by the policies underlying such grants.82 However, in this same
case the Court was also asked to allow the licensee, if its challenge
to the patent succeeded, to defend against non-payment for the
conveyance of common law interests in the invention prior to pat-
enting.13 On this point the Court refused to rule, although it asserted
its power to do so in the following terms:
[W]e have concluded, after much consideration, that even though
an important question of federal law underlies this phase of the
controversy, we should not now attempt to define in even a limited
way the extent, if any, to which the States may properly act to
enforce the contractual rights of inventors of unpatented secret
ideas. Given the difficulty and importance of this task, it should
be undertaken only after the state courts have, after fully focused
inquiry, determined the extent to which they will respect the con-
tractual rights of such inventors in the future."
The language of this conclusion to Lear set forth the doctrine that
the state courts have a certain latitude in applying their contract
rules to conveyances of creators' rights, but that such application
federal common law might preclude the use of preassignments in general if federal policy were
clearly put in jeopardy by them. Under Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 153 (1969), the issue
would be: Is such policy undercut by the particular way state law treats these terms?
81. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
82. Id. at 670-74. Also, a contrary result would discourage parties from entering licenses at
all in that they might thus be bound to pay for ultimately invalid patent rights.
83. Id. at 674-75.
84. Id. at 675. See Comment, Patent Law-Estoppel-Doctrine of Licensee Estoppel Over-
ruled: State Protection of Unprotected Inventions Questioned-Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 45
N.Y.U.L. REV. 386, 389-95 (1970), for an analysis of this language at the conclusion of Lear,
recommending that state protection of unpatented ideas not be preempted by federal protec-
tion.
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must be in accord with the policies underlying federal statutory
grants."
There are points at which the federal statute itself purports to
govern preassignment claims." It follows from Lear, however, that
its doctrine conditions the application of state law to those agency
and contract issues which are not controlled by the federal statute.7
For instance, section 26 of the former Copyright Act defined the
"author" in whom the copyright would vest to include "an employer
in the case of works made for hire."88 It was upon this section that
the court in Scherr v. Universal Match Corporation" based its deci-
sion that, since the Army was the "employer" of the draftees who
made the work in question, it retained the copyrights deriving from
the work. 0 Section 101 of the newly enacted Copyright Act limits
the work for hire provision in accord with the traditionally restric-
tive common law approach to preassignments by specifying that a
"work for hire" must be made "within the scope . . . of employ-
ment."". Such federal statutory language, however, leaves open the
following threshold question on which state agency and contract law
could be dispositive:"2 Should a court enforce the employment rela-
85. The states are free, absent explicit preemption by federal statute, to promote those
same policies with their own contract and tort law. Cf. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,
558-59 (1972) (allowing state cause of action for record piracy not covered by federal copyright
law in order "to induce new artistic creations"); and Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470, 478-79, 485-90 (1974) (allowing state to protect trade secrets in accord with its own
appreciation of intellectual achievement).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1976).
87. Under the Erie doctrine (Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)), state law
would traditionally define "work for hire" and "scope of employment". This author knows of
no case in which any "federal common law" is expressly invoked to define such terms.
88. 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1947), now found in above-cited 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1976).
89. See note 46 supra.
90. See text accompanying notes 46-51 supra.
91. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (last definition). See Angel and Tannenbaum, Works Made for
Hire Under S. 22, 22 N.Y.L.S. REv. 209 (1976), for a discussion of this change, media pressures
for retention of the "writer for hire" presumption, and still applicable case law. .
92. A distinction, at best implicit in the opinions, could be drawn between employers'
claims to copyright based on participation in the creative process, as against claims based
on agency and/or contractual grounds. It is the latter type of claim which concerns us here.
. An employer, on the one hand, might have a section 201 claim, formerly a section 26 claim,
on a copyright on the grounds that by furnishing the original conception of the work of art,
he functioned as its creator. Thus in Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp.,
369 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1966), the court observed: "It seems likely that the local business-
men, who often cooperated in designing the advertisements, were naive with respect to the
complete provisions of the copyright law . . . ." One rationale, then, for having those busi-
nessmen retain copyright to the advertisements, rather than allowing its transfer to the
original publisher hired to print it, is that they were in fact the authors.
An authorship claim to copyright is, however, conceptually distinct from a claim based on
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tion or contract provision under which a preassignment is claimed
so that the employer obtains rights for hire?
Judge Friendly, dissenting in Scherr,3 anticipated the applica-
tion of the Lear doctrine to just that preassignment issue. He specif-
ically stated that inferring that a work was made "for hire" where
an employer clearly bargained for the work in question "can be
squared with the policy of the Constitution and the Copyright
Act."" Judge Friendly, as noted above, then observed that there was
no unambiguous factual basis in the record on which to find such a
clear bargain and assent relative to a particular work at issue on
summary judgment." The implication of his dissent is that, unless
there was sufficient evidence for a finding of agreement to create
works such as that in question, the constitutional and statutory
policy he cites would preclude enforcing a preassignment claim." At
the very least his reasoning suggests that such policies might be
better served by a threshold inquiry into whether there was assent
to the relation or contract underlying such claim.
B. Creators' Rights at Stake in Preassignments
It is crucial at this point to analyze the full range of legal interests
that preassignment claims bear upon and, through such analysis, to
ascertain underlying preemptive policies. Often the event that
prompts an employer to assert a preassignment against an employee
is the latter's disclosure of his creation to a third party." This is no
accident since the key interest in the constellation of those which a
creator may claim in his products of mind is,the right to control
agency or contract principles. See note 141 infra. But see 1 NIMMER, supra note 11, 238.2-239,
summarizing case law to the effect that "[tihe crucial question in determining an employ-
ment relationship is whether the alleged employer has the right to direct and supervise the
manner in which the writer performs his work." If the employer directs such work in accord
with his own original creative vision, this fact would constitute evidence of authorship of the
work to be copyrighted, as distinguished from the determination of a work "made for hire."
But the mere fact that an employer directs an author's work, although it may prove some
agency relationship, does not raise the inference that he has hired this other party to create
a particular work in question. See text accompanying note 48 supra, explaining that the
employer's right to direct in Scherr most probably stemmed from sheer military authority
rather than freely bargained-for terms of hire. Indeed, a party commissioning a work of art
may exercise no power to direct and still retain copyrights in the work. See 1 NIMMER, supra
note 11, at 244-46.1.
93. 217 F.2d 497, 502-03 (2d Cir. 1969).
94. Id. at 502.
95. Id. at 502-503.
96. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 11, at 13-14.
97. E.g., Jamesbury, discussed in text accompanying notes 65-67 supra.
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their disclosure." Such control, we shall see, is basic to any under-
standing of the policies which justify the grant of statutory rights
such as copyrights and patents.
Warren and Brandeis analyze the control of disclosure as a pri-
vacy interest, that is, the "right of determining, ordinarily, to what
extent . . . thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communi-
cated to others."" This interest, they explain, arises for the creator
in the form of common law copyright, ". . . which enables him to
control absolutely the act of publication, irrespective of any com-
mercial interests in his work." 00 For instance, the author of private
letters may enjoin a recipient, who may own the paper on which
they are written, from divulging their contents to others."" Further,
trade secret law, as Holmes explains in E.I. du Pont de JNemours
Powder Co. v. Masland,102 allows the creator, in this case the origin-
ator of a secret process, to sue for unauthorized disclosure of the
process by any party to whom it was communicated in trust. It
remains an open question whether this common law privacy interest
is constitutionally fundamental.' 3
98. See Nash, The Concept of "Property: in Know-How as a Growing Area of Industrial
Property: Its Sales and Licensing, 6 P.T.C. J. REs. & ED. 289 (1962).
99. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198 (1890).
100. Id. at 200. Warren and Brandeis here focus on what was traditionally called the
author's "right of first publication." See Jenkins v. News Syndicate Co., Inc. 128 Misc. 284,
219 N.Y.S. 196 (1926) (seminal cases and Warren and Brandeis were cited to support the
holding that an author is entitled to sue for unauthorized publication of a story by the
newspaper which had hired her to write it).
101. CAL. CIV. CODE § 985 (West 1954). See Note, Personal Letters: In Need of a Law of
Their Own, 44 IOWA L. REV. 705 (1959).
102. 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917).
103. See Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 348-49, 296 N.Y.S.2d 711, 778
(1969) (possible First Amendment claim to withhold publication of interview). See also Ke-
wanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487 (1974) (dictum) ("a most fundamental
human right, that of privacy," linked to interest in maintaining trade secrets). See generally
Nimmer, Copyright and the First Amendment, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1180, 1186-87 (1976).
This article does not base its argument on the proposition that certain creators' rights are
constitutionally fundamental, but should open up inquiry into that possibility. See Warren
and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 200 et seq. (1890) arguing not merely
that common law copyright derives from the privacy interest, but also that it is an original
manifestation of that interest. See Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968), expanding the
analysis of the privacy interest as the right to control disclosure and tying it intimately into
First Amendment freedom of association and thought. If creation resulted from "sparks" of
genius in isolated individuals, it could be contended that this right to control disclosure was
important to these individuals only because it allowed them to keep their ideas secret until
the rest of the world was ready to pay for disclosure. See text accompanying notes 109-16
infra. Creative thought, however, does not occur in some sort of "Cartesian" isolation, but is
channeled through a language of some symbolic medium that ties the individual creator into
one or a number of communities. See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 92
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There are other common law interests that a creator may claim
in his products of mind.04 He may elaborate on his own ideas freely.
Thus the author of the Maltese Falcon, after selling proprietary
rights in the story, could not be prevented by his vendees from
developing its principal character further in sequel stories.,"' More
directly subject to preassignment is the interest of the creator in
profiting from his products of mind in the marketplace. Courts have
protected the originators of story lines and other program materials
by allowing them to sue for compensation for the unauthorized use
of such material by the media. 00 Otherwise, absent a cause of action
under an implied-in-fact contract or in restitution, the creator
would run the risk that, in disclosing ideas in commercial negotia-
tions, an offeree would use the disclosed material without rendering
any reasonable consideration.o'0 In International News Service v.
The Associated Press,0 the Supreme Court has gone so far as to
allow one news service to sue to restrain another, for limited periods
of time, from using and reselling the contents of its own already
published dispatches, thus protecting the originating service's inter-
est in profiting from its products. Of course, once an employee work-
ing under an enforceable preassignment has disclosed his creation
et seq., 174 et seq. (2d ed. 1970); G. H. MEAD, MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY 198, 214 et seq., 218,
222 (1934); 5 C.S. PIERCE, COLLECTED PAPERS 135-213 (1934). Thus the right to control disclo-
sure represents the freedom of the creator to participate in such community, to choose to
whom and how his ideas are communicated, and thereby to influence how they feed back into
his own creative process. See text accompanying notes 128, 135-37 infra.
104. See Nash, supra note 98; Mamorek, The Inventor's Common Law Rights Today, 50
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 369 (1968).
105. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 216 F.2d 945 (9th
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955). But while the author at common law has the
privilege of elaborating in new works, themes originated in previous works already conveyed
to others, he cannot, as can the creator under the continental doctrine of "droit moral," sue
these other parties for adapting or modifying such conveyed works to the point of destroying
their aesthetic integrity. See Treece, American Analogues of Author's "Moral Right," 16 AM.
J. Comp. LAW 487 (1968).
106. See, e.g., Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956) (contract to disclose
non-novel material may be implied); Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal. 2d 778, 256 P.2d 947
(1953) (analysis of a dissent in Stanley adopted to allow suit under contract implied in fact);
Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 35 Cal. 2d 653, 672, 221 P.2d 73, 84 (1950) (dis-
sent: no contract to pay for disclosure could be implied in fact). See 2 NIMMER, supra note
11, at Chapter 15, who argues, at 168.1-168.2, that a theory of unjust enrichment may be
applied in some cases where no contract for disclosure can be implied in fact.
107. Cf. Note, Beyond the Realm of Copyright: Is There Legal Sanctuary for the Merchant
of Ideas?, 41 BROOK. L. REV. 284 (1974), (discussing the dilemma of one who must disclose
an idea as part of an offer to convey interests in it, for instance the right to control disclosure
to a third party, and then who finds the disclosee profiting from it without accepting the terms
of the offer).
108. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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to his employer,1oo he would be barred from suing the latter for
damages or injunction.
The creator's interest in controlling disclosure of his own ideas is
a right in a "Hohfeldian" sense, in that he may sue to restrain
anyone from divulging these ideas."" But the creator has no legal
claim against parties who elaborate on ideas and convey for profit
products of mind similar to his own but which these parties inde-
pendently conceive or discover."' Thus creators may not exercise
their common law interests in freely developing and profiting from
their products of mind to exclude each other from, and thereby
monopolize, any area of creativity." 2 Still, through the careful exer-
cise of the right to control disclosure, creators are often able to
exercise their privilege to elaborate on ideas and power to convey
their products as if they were exclusive rights."' If a creator main-
tains his ideas in confidence and there is no such parallel innovation
by others, he alone will be able to work these ideas into products of
mind which, absent intervening preassignment claims, he may ex-
clusively profit from."' This key role of the right to control disclo-
109. See text accompanying notes 135-37 infra.
110. W.N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONs 39 et seq., 72 (ed. with new forward
by A. Corbin, 1973). See Nash, supra note 98, at 293 et seq., who explains how Hohfeld's
clarification of "rights," "privilege" and "power" applies here. According to Hohfeld, confu-
sion is avoided when the "property" right to exclude others is not used all inclusively to refer
to other more limited entitlements. See note 1 supra.
111. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 980(a), 984 (West 1954). See Schreyer v. Caseo Products Corp., 97
F. Supp. 159, 168-69 (D. Conn. 1951); 190 F.2d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 1951). In Schreyer plaintiff
had revealed his unpatentable device to defendant in confidence in an offer of sale of rights.
Upon the finding that the plaintiff's device could have been independently developed by
defendant although only upon some investment of time and capital, the courts held defendant
liable for unauthorized use until that time at which such independent development would
have been possible.
112. See text accompanying notes 138 and 150 infra. The Supreme Court, in Lear, Inc. v.
Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 675 (1969), not only ruled that a contract expanding a statutory patent
monopoly beyond constitutional limits is not permissible, but also clearly warned that the
same contract, if it allocated common law interests with similar effects, would be suspect.
Cf. 1 NIMMER, supra note 11, at 6.2-6.5, on how terms of a statute granting monopoly ought
to limit common law interests.
113. See Nash, supra note 98, at 296-98; Mamorek, The Inventor's Common Law Rights
Today, 50 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 369, 382-84 (1968).
114. But see Nash, supra note 98, explaining that this seems possible only with
"[miethod-inventions . . . because most other inventions are self-revealing by the marked
product." However, this observation ignores the dynamics of modern research and develop-
ment in which, during the time lag when competitors might reverse-engineer a product, the
underlying secret technology might allow further, competitively advantageous advances. See
Note, The Development of the Sherman Act Section 2 Market Share Test and Its Inapplica-
bility to Dynamic Markets, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 154, 195-97 (1975) and authorities cited therein.
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sure may indeed explain the reluctance of the courts to find its
waiver through intentional and unconditional publication." 5
This brings us to the rationale for granting statutory rights such
as copyrights and patents, both of which may be transferred by
preassignment. There is an unavoidable tension between the indi-
vidual's privacy interest in controlling disclosure of his creations
and the public interest in the free flow of ideas."' If creators could
profit from exclusive use and sale of their products of mind only by
maintaining their innovations in guild-like secrecy, they would
withhold valuable ideas and data from cultural and scientific ex-
change."' The framers of the Constitution sought to resolve this
tension by specifically empowering Congress to secure for creators,
in exchange for total public disclosure of significant innovations,
exclusive statutory rights."' Through his remedies for infringements
115. CAL. CIv. CODE § 983 (West 1954). Cf. Components for Research, Inc. v. Isolation
Prods., Inc., 241 Cal. App. 2d 726, 729-31, 50 Cal. Rptr. 829, (1966) (disclosure of process to
employee did not waive trade secret protection that did not extend to non-secret methods);
Read v. Turner, 239 Cal. App. 2d 504, 510-14, 48 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1966) (disclosure of plans to
construction bidders did not waive common law copyright, but furnishing copies to house
purchasers did.
Publication prior to fulfilling statutory requirements used to waive rights to statutory
protection, but again the courts were reluctant to find such waiver. See King v. Mister
Maestro, Inc. 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (furnishing press excerpts, as well as subse-
quent national broadcasting, filming and reporting of speech did not preclude eventual copy-
right). But see 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976), which provides that statutory copyright will subsist
from the "creation" of a work, thus superseding any rule of waiver by publication subsequent
to "creation." See also In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 498 F.2d 271 (5th
Cir. 1974) (public display of model or licensing during development of invention does not
preclude eventual patent). But cf. Mahon, Trade Secrets and Patents Compared, 50 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'v 536, 537 (1978), (discussing the Patent Reform Bill of 1967, § 123, and present
patent invalidation rates, whereby the unsuccessful patentee, upon having applied for statu-
tory protection, might have also lost common law trade secret protection). Cf. Hyde Corp. v.
Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 588-92, 314 S.W.2d 763, 772-73 (1958) (disclosure in patent applica-
tion need not preclude protection against trade secret misappropriation).
116. See Donaldson v. Beckett, 1 Eng. R. 837 (H.L. 1774). This seminal case discusses
common law copyright, as well as its waiver through publication and its preemption by
statutory protection, in terms of public policy which contemporary judicial analyses, know-
ingly or not, often seem to readopt. But see 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1976), which seems to make
this tension a thing of the past for copyright by providing, in conjunction with 17 U.S.C. §
302(a) (1976), statutory protection commencing at the time of "creation," while replacing any
equivalent right at common law. But 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3) (1976) makes clear that the new
Act does not supersede non-equivalent creators' interests at common law. Thus the old
problem of statutory preemption of common law protection may persist in the realm of
copyright. Indeed, the ambiguity of the term "creation" is apparently left to the courts to
construe.
117. See Prager, The Early Growth and Influence of Intellectual Property, 34 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 106, 128 et seq. (1952).
118. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1933): "In
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of such rights, the creator is assured of the incidents of exclusive
ownership, which is in effect a monopoly over use and sale, that he
would otherwise only enjoy by limiting disclosure.' The Constitu-
tion restricts recourse to these remedies to limited periods of time
in order to allow the public to gain eventually unrestricted access
to the originally protected products. 2 o Preassignments to the extent
claimed by large-scale employers would concentrate such rights in
their own hands.
Courts use various theories to explain how the grant of exclusive
rights effectuates the express purpose of the Copyright and Patent
Clause: "to promote the progress of science and the useful arts."' 2'
Such rights provide economic incentives that presumably stimulate
creators both to develop their ideas into usable products of mind
and to market them as widely as possible.'2 2 Also, once assured that
publication for copyright purposes or application for patents will not
waive important legal interests, creators are more likely to disclose
their ideas which, through a process of cross-fertilization with other
lines of thought, generate still further innovations.'2 3 Moreover, a
consideration of its disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the patent is
granted."
119. See 17 U.S.C. H§ 106 et seq., 502 et seq. (1976). Section 1 of the former Copyright Act,
17 U.S.C. § 1 (1959), also enumerated "rights of the copyright holder." See 1 NIMMER, supra
note 11, at Ch. 8, explaining how such "rights" differ according to the work copyrighted. See
35 U.S.C. § 271 (1954), which defines "infringement" of patent. See note 15 supra, and
authorities cited therein, concerning remedies for infringement.
120. See Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Co., 326 U.S. 249, 255-57 (1945) and authorities cited
therein, (patentee may not, by contract or use of trademark, extend his monopoly beyond
expiration).
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See THE FEDERALIST, No. 43 (J. Madison) 267 (H.C. Lodge
ed. 1888): "The Public good fully coincides in both cases [copyright and patent grants] with
the claims of individuals." Cf. 1 NIMMER, supra note 11, at 6.6, (assuming that the drafters
of the Constitution sought to promote the public interest by according property status to
creations, a theory which coincides with the judicial view of the basically economic nature of
the incentive to create). But see A. KOESTLER, THE ACT OF CREATION 495-512 (1964); Rossman,
Rewards and Incentives to Employee-Inventors, 7 F.T.C.J. REs. & ED. 431, 448 (1963); Rabi-
now, The Anti-Inventory Report of the Patent System, 11 IDEA 47, 49 (1967), who expose other
motives at work in the creative process, such as an exploratory drive, and a sense of achieve-
ment and reinforcement from fellow researchers and the public, in short curiosity, self-
fulfillment and glory.
122. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
219 (1954).
123. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 8-9 n.2 (1966), citing 6
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180 (Washington ed. 1814); REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE
JuIcIARY, U.S. SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, REPORT No.
118, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965): "Another major objective which industry believes should
be accomplished by the patent system is to advance the cross-fertilization of ideas by encour-
aging publication of inventions rather than their suppression as trade secrets. Yet another
purpose of the patent system listed was its role as a classified source of information concerning
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system opting for incentives for creation and disclosure, rather than
some scheme to "take" ideas through a kind of eminent domain
proceeding, may be more consistent with the freedom of thought
and communication essential to the creative process itself.,"
C. Policies Put in Jeopardy by Preassignment
Preassignments are prima facie suspect because they alienate
rights which are granted to individuals for the purpose of encourag-
ing them to create."' Judicial analysis has criticized the tendency
of large corporations to monopolize research facilities and talent,
while taking all rights in resulting products of mind under preas-
signments, thus undercutting the incentives these rights ought to
provide creators.120 Arguably the consideration demanded for sign-
ing a freely negotiated preassignment might replace the exclusive
power to profit and corresponding incentive to create which the
statutory right provides, but the same claim can hardly be made for
a standard form provision to which there is no effective assent.'
Also, empirical studies, although unable to delineate systematically
the preconditions of innovation, indicate that employees' control
over the communication and elaboration of their own ideas en-
existing technology so as to aid the conduct of research and also to prevent duplication of
effort."
124. The Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2181 et seq. (1973), in effect allows the Federal
Government to acquire atomic energy related patents by exercising a right of eminent do-
main. See Hobbs v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 451 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1971) (inventor of
nuclear related device "taken" by government entitled to "just compensation").
However, if underlying creators' rights represent more than mere property, but rather stem
from interests constitutionally more fundamental, the state may be limited in its authority
to condemn products of mind and, especially, in its power to compel or even indirectly coerce
their disclosure. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 190-93 (1933);
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 494 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring):
"Rather, the question presented in this case is whether Congress, in enacting the patent laws,
intended merely to offer inventors a limited monopoly in exchange for disclosure of their
inventions, or instead to exert pressure on inventors to enter into this exchange by withdraw-
ing any alternative possibility of legal protection for their inventions. I am persuaded that
the former is the case." The larger policy issue is whether, given the freedom of communica-
tion and thought essential to the creative process, any state action or private conveyances
alienating these interests might not be counter-productive for encouraging creativity. See text
accompanying notes 128-29 and 135-39 infra.
125. See Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 646, 678-82 (1846); Scherr v. Universal
Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 501 (2d Cir. 1969) (dissent); 1 NIMMER, supra note 11, at 13-14.
126. See Potts v. Coe, 145 F.2d 27, 28-30 (D.C. 1944) (higher standard of patentability for
corporation-assignee).
127. See text accompanying notes 61-75 supra, distinguishing 'bargained-for' from
'unnegotiated' preassignments.
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hances creativity."2 A preassignment can, however, provide a basis
for imposing liability on any employee who exercises his right to
control disclosure by communicating to third parties and, if coupled
with the duty to disclose promptly to a superior, might freeze com -
munication within the firm."' Thus, in eliminating economic incen-
tive and adversely influencing other preconditions of creativity,
preassignments without clear assent contravene the policy of en-
couraging innovation.
The counter-argument to this critique would have one believe
that large corporations depend on broadly termed contracts to pro-
tect their investments in research and development."" If this were
true to the point where investment in research and development
could not be profitably made without such broad preassignment
terms, one might well ask whether such investment was indeed cost-
effective, or else at whose cost it has shown profits.'"' For, if over-
reaching preassignments were indispensable to profitable research,
the employees whose claims to creators' rights were barred by their
operation would have paid part of the price of that research, al-
though their contribution would not have been proportionately com-
pensated. Furthermore, two conditions attenuate the force of the
argument that investment would be diminished: first, investment
may be a function of numerous other factors besides contract cer-
tainty; 3 2 and, second, there is no reliable way to measure whether
investment in research, along with numerous other factors, actually
increases the rate of innovation.' 3 Commentators critical of preas-
128. See A. CaosBy, CREATIVITY AND PERFORMANCE IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, Chs. 2, 10
(1968); Siegel, Employee Creativity and Organizational Aims, 9 IDEA 401, 408-12 (1965), and
authorities cited therein.
129. See note 17 supra. One consequence of channeling new ideas to superiors such as
department heads in large firms is that the ideas often go no farther. See text accompanying
notes 139-40 infra.
130. See Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 642-43 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J.,
concurring); Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 578-79, 160 A.2d 430, 434-35 (1960) (stressing
that trade secret protection optimizes firm efficiency, but finding no liability for disclosure
of employer's formulae based on knowledge acquired on the job). See also O'MEARA, supra
note 7, at 13-14.
131. Cf. DANIEL HAMBERG, ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, Part
2 (1966) [hereinafter cited as HAMBERG] (criticizing the assumption that investment in large-
scale corporation or government research projects is necessarily effective).
132. See SCHRUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 84 (3d ed. 1950), explaining
that innovation gives the ultimate competitive advantage. See note 114 supra, suggesting that
firms are driven into research and development to avoid a competitively dangerous lag in
innovation. See also HAMBERG, supra note 131, at 5-26, 115-47, for other factors.
133. See Kunets, Inventive Activity: Problems of Definition and Measurement, in
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH: THE RATE AND DURATION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 19-
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signments cite statistics to the effect that, while investment in re-
search and development has been increasing in the United States
relative to the rest of the industrialized world, its relative share of
patents is decreasing. 34 The foregoing discussion of the disincentive
for innovation generated by preassignments suggests the conclu-
sion that preassignments are a direct cause of this discrepancy.
Preassignment imposed without effective assent also directly bur-
dens the rapid disclosure of creations, delaying their ultimate wide-
spread dissemination and use. Trade secret protection assumes that
if enterprises enter an agreement to disclose a secret for considera-
tion, upon breach of such agreement they may sue for expected
profits."' An employee who labors under a preassignment in effect
transfers to his employer any right to sue for misappropriation of his
own products of mind. Thus, like the enterprise without trade secret
protection, the employee who could not bargain for due considera-
tion upon signing the preassignment is without recompense or rem-
edy for the employer's use of his creation.'" It is claimed that thou-
sands of employees in the United States therefore maintain "idea
files" in which they guard secret ideas and plans against the day
when they will quit their jobs and sell their creations to third par-
ties.'"3 Any such deferral of disclosure due to preassignment runs
counter to the policy of maximizing the input of new ideas into
cultural and economic life.
It is true that preassignments may work as effective contractual
mechanisms for a creator to profit from his talents and to have his
products marketed across the country. They do allow him to ex-
51 (1962); Sanders, Some Difficulties in Measuring Inventive Activity, in id. at 53-83, discuss-
ing the problematic nature of measures of innovation. Any attempt to find a functional
relation between rates of investment in research, along with less easily quantifiable variables
such as educational levels and cultural background, and innovation itself must be specula-
tive.
134. See Orkin, The Legal Rights of the Employed Inventor: New Approaches to Old
Problems (Part II), 56 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 719, 727-30 (1974).
135. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 486-87 (1974); adopting analysis
of Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 223 (2d Cir. 1971).
136. See O'MEARA, supra note 7, at 29: "For all practical purposes, the disclosure of an
invention amounts to conveyance of title." This is not merely because the employee is, under
the preassignment, obligated to execute such a conveyance, but also because it precludes
remedy for the employer's use of his idea subsequent to disclosure. This distinguishes the
employee from the creator who may sue a disclosee for unjust enrichment or misappropriation
of an idea he submits to him. Cf. 2 NIMMER, Supra note 11, at 734.2-74.3, (discussing the
Kewanee analysis as it applies to submissions).
137. This quotation is in the Congressional Record upon introduction of the Moss Bill, H.R.
2370, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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change his services with large scale corporations with research facili-
ties necessary to implement his ideas and with market access indis-
pensable to distribution of his products on a wide scale.' But,
unless this exchange is freely negotiated in accord with both the
creator's and his employer's perceptions of the relative advantages
for each, the preassignment is not likely to implement the socially
desired goals of maximizing use of research facilities and the distri-
bution of resultant creations. Unbargained-for preassignments, in
addition to impairing incentives to create and disclose, also tend to
reinforce certain tendencies of large-scale enterprises to waste op-
portunities for exploiting collateral creations. Employees who create
outside defined research projects often find that their superiors
merely shelve their submitted ideas because they do not fit into the
corporate development and marketing strategy.'" If enforceable,
preassignments form a basis for making an employee liable for tak-
ing his ideas to other parties who might be more amenable to under-
taking their development and sale, thus discouraging him from
seeking their optimal use."o
The foregoing discussion indicates that policies underlying the
Authors and Inventors Clause of the Constitution preclude enforc-
ing a preassignment predicated on terms of hire to which an em-
ployee did not clearly assent. Counter-arguments to the effect that
corporations also ought to be given incentives to create fail to ad-
dress the contractual question of assent in situations with which this
article especially deals, namely, those where individuals alone do
the creating."' Indeed the policies at stake make it incumbent on
138. See COSTA, THE LAW OF INVENTING 127-29.
139. See HAMBERG, supra note 130, at Chapter 5, Rueben, Imaginative Thinking and Op-
portunities Afforded an Independent Inventor by the American Patent System, 49 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 442, 454-57 (1969); Orkin, The Legal Rights of the Employed Inventor: New
Approaches to Old Problems (Part II), 56 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 719, 729-30 (1974) explaining
corporate resistance to innovations developed outside defined projects.
140. Cf. Barnes, Breaking the Innovation Barrier, 9 IDEA 223, 232-33 (1965), (illustrating
the initiative which the inventor will take in finding an investor ready to attempt the success-
ful exploitation of his idea).
141. See Note, The Doctrine of Inventorship: Its Ramifications in Patent Law, 16 WEST.
RES. L. REV. 1342, 1346-51, 1365-66 (1966), arguing that a corporation should be allowed to
patent in its own name because (1) most major corporations obtain assignments of inventions
from their employees and (2) patents may issue to them on the basis of such assignment. The
first reason begs the question of the contractual validity of such assignments and preassign-
ments. The second does not distinguish between the corporation's having the patent issued
to it through assignment of a specific invention under 35 U.S.C. § 152 (1967) and its being
able to file for it by virtue of preassignment under the more restrictive 35 U.S.C. § 118 (1967).
See note 190, infra.
As discussed in note 103 supra, it may well be philosophically untenable to assume that
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the courts to develop more effective methods for scrutinizing for
such assent where corporate industry has resorted to new bases for
asserting preassignment claims, such as standard forms' terms or
unbargained-for transfers.
IV. Adhesion Analysis in a New Area
The law, it has been seen, has developed no systematic response
to the now widespread use of standard forms and job transfers as
new grounds for asserting preassignment claims. The cases display
circumstances in which such contractual devices and agency rela-
tions are manifestly imposed without the effective assent of subject
employees who eventually create new products of mind.'4 2 Thus, in
enforcing preassignment claims without testing them for effective
assent, courts risk undermining the constitutionally based rationale
for securing creators' rights. An effective test for such assent, it is
here proposed, would be to scrutinize claims of preassignment ac-
cording to adhesion analysis.
A. The Theory of Strict Scrutiny for Adhesion
The theory of the proposed analysis is applicable to a wide variety
of situations. It is basic to all contract theory that individual agree-
ments replace the authority of the state in governing private af-
fairs."' Thus, in accord with a common-law and legislative frame-
work, parties regulate their own affairs with rules, in effect a law of
their own making."' But a contract, like the state, can be made to
rule private affairs undemocratically, namely when the courts en-
force provisions to which parties have neither assented nor would
the creator works in isolation. Cf. B. EDELMAN, LE DRort SAISI PAR LA PHOTOGRAPHIE 49-62
(1973), whose Marxist analysis delineates "the collective subject" which the team of authors,
directors and artists constitute in creating a modem film, but criticizes the judicial tendency
to confuse this group creator with the parties financing the film. Allowing the corporation, a
fiction created to allow large-scale financing, to claim creators' rights directly as well as
acquiescing in its claims under adhesive preassignments, compounds such confusion.
The problem of collective creatorship might best be approached by facilitating joint claims
to creator's rights. See Lorenzo, The Inventive Entity and the Law of Double Patenting, 50
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 519 (1968) Tresansky, Inventorship Determination, 56 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
551 (1974), who discuss the problems now associated with joint claims.
142. See note 12 and Part II supra.
143. See 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTs § 1 (1963); Llewellyn, What Price Contracts?-An Essay
in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 716-18, 728-34 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Llewellyn].
144. See H. HAVINGHURST, THE NATURE OF PRIVATE CONTRACT, 122 et seq. (1961), for the
various constraints that legislatures place on private rule-making, sometimes in the name of
protecting equality of bargaining power.
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assent had they the chance to.' 5 Just as the courts review legislation
which has not been passed in accord with constitutional guarantees
of the democratic process, they may scrutinize contracts which bear
the earmarks of lack of effective assent. 4
Courts have traditionally invalidated contracts for defects in as-
sent such as fraud, duress and mistake."' With the rise of economies
of scale, mass production and distribution, there has been an ever-
increasing use of standard form contracts.' This phenomenon,
commentators have noted, often leaves a private party little choice
in entering certain transactions but that of signing the standard
form which has been provided him.'# The Uniform Commercial
Code, under the doctrine of unconscionability, authorizes courts to
scrutinize oppressively one-sided contract provisions to determine
whether they manifest meaningful assent.1so American courts have
developed their own analysis as an independent method to focus on
the "take it or leave it" character of standard forms, especially as
used in insurance and consumer contexts.'"' Commentators in Eu-
rope, where this particular defect in assent was originally pin-
pointed as adhesion, have already proposed applying such analysis
in employment contexts.'52 It is here proposed that adhesion analy-
sis be applied to both standard preassignment forms and unilateral
changes of employment status on the basis of which preassignments
are claimed.' 3
145. See Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 530, 534, 536 et seq. (1971) [hereinafter cited as SlawsonJ.
146. See id. at 538 et seq.
147. 1A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 288 (1963); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, § § 492, 493 (1932).
See Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253 (1947).
148. See Llewellyn, supra note 143, at 731; Slawson, supra note 145, at 529-31.
149, See Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 221 F.2d 189, 204-06 (2d Cir. 1954) (dissent);
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion: Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 629, 632 (1943), who speaks of "take it or leave it" contracts.
.150. U.C.C. § 2-302. See Spagnole, Analysing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L.
REV. 931, 942 et seq. (1969), separating out some of the factors that go into a determination
of unconscionability. But see Ellighaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757,
762, 768, 773-86 (1969), who elaborates on the distinction between "substantive" (unfair
terms) and "procedural" (defective assent) unconscionability; Slawson, supra note 145, at
564-65.
151. See text accompanying notes 154-63, 167-74 and 177-86 infra.
152. The notion of adhesion was first applied to standard form contracts in France at the
turn of the century. See generally FRAUSCHrZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CON-
TRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW (1937). See also Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV.
L. REV. 700 (1939). For application to employment context, see Lyon-Caen, Dkfense et
illustration du contrat de travail in 13 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DE DROIT, 59, 61 (1968).
153. It may not be immediately self-evident that implying a contract term from an
unbargained-for shift in employment status in effect imposes it adhesively. But see Isaacs,
30 [Vol. 2
CREATORS' RIGHTS
B. The Three-Pronged Test for Adhesion
The subject employee finds himself in a "take it or leave it"
situation in the introductory hypothetical as well as in cases dis-
cussed above. How should a court scrutinize for adhesion the claim
of preassignment which the employer might make in such situations
on the basis of (1) the standard form signed upon hire, or (2) job
function thereafter assigned. The cases on adhesion have developed
a three-pronged test for adhesion which can be used here.
1. Fixed and Invariable Provisions as Potentially Adhesive
A party not writing or providing a standard form often does not
have any opportunity to negotiate any change in its provisions be-
fore completing the transaction which it governs. To deal with such
situations, the courts have developed a threshold criterion of adhe-
sion: for one party, who can here be called the adhering party, the
contract provision at issue is fixed ahead of time and is not open
to variation in any bargaining process. Thus, in Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,'" the adhering party could not modify
the exculpatory clause in the manufacturer's standard warranty
because the sales agency with which he dealt had no authority to
change that provision.
It need not be assumed, however, that only standard form con-
tracts have this fixed character. As one commentator explains: "A
standard form contract is not always adhesive, and the absence of
a standard form does not guarantee that the contract is not adhe-
sive."'"5 Still, the standard form remains particularly illustrative of
adhesion, for "[t]he predominance of standard form increases the
proportion of contracts that are adhesive. Standardization reduces
the number of choices . . . ."15 On the other hand, trade practice
or custom, if not subject to critical judicial scrutiny, could have the
same effect as a fixed written provision. Anyone who would attempt
to bargain around the practices is likely to meet the objection that
it is just not negotiable.'
The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917), where the author explains how the
involuntary imposition of duties on the basis of status is avoided by adhesion analysis.
154. 32 N.J. 358, 390, 161 A.2d 69, 87 (1960).
155. Slawson, supra note 145, at 549-50.
156. Id. at 550.
157. See, e.g., Schreiber, The Copyright War Between Editors and Writers, WRrlER's
DIGEST, 18-21 (January 1979), explaining how editors continue to attempt to impose the
traditional "writer for hire" presumption as a non-negotiable contractual term despite the
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2. The Relative Difficulty of Finding an Alternative
The mere fact that a contract is invariable suggests, but does not
prove, adhesion. In certain situations, a party may shop for the best
standard form available and find one to which he would gladly
assent. But, if the same fixed provision is standard across an indus-
try, or if the party is in a situation that precludes any chance to
search for an alternative, that provision may well command unwill-
ing acquiescence. Hence another threshold criterion is suggested for
adhesion: If a party did not accept the invariable provision, he could
not, without undue hardship, find a substitute transaction with
different terms or do without the entire transaction. In
Henningsen68 the court pointed out that the adhering party would
have found the same exculpatory clause in every automobile war-
ranty and that modern life made it difficult to dispense with the
automobile. In Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California,,'
the court noted that a party arriving at a hospital emergency en-
trance while in "great pain" was compelled to sign the hospital's
liability release form or else forgo treatment he urgently needed.
In short, the party not formulating the fixed provisions of the con-
tract has no effective alternative but to accept them.
The difficulty of finding an alternative may be relative to the
extent to which similar invariable provisions are used by possible
competitors for a given transaction. 0 Or it may be relative to the
difficulty of finding a substitute for that transaction, as in
O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co.,'"' where a party
challenged an exculpatory clause in a lease signed during a housing
shortage. The court split concerning the significance of the circum-
stances: the majority required the party claiming adhesion to have
shown that it could not negotiate the clause away, while the minor-
ity would have found that the housing shortage itself made it exces-
sively burdensome to strike or find another deal.' The relative
difficulty of finding an alternative will in effect put one party in a
fact the new Copyright Act narrows the scope of the doctrine and explicitly allows it to be
negotiated away.
158. 32 N.J. 358, 386, 403, 161 A.2d 69, 85, 94 (1960).
159. 60 Cal. 2d 92, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441 (1963).
160. See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REv. 629, 632, 640-41 (1943). But see Slawson, supra note 145, at 553 et seq., where
the author explains that alternatives may be lacking in perfectly competitive as well as
monopolistic situations,
161. 15 Ill. 2d 436, 155 N.E.2d 545 (1959).
162. Id. at 439-46, 444-47, 155 N.E.2d at 547-52.
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weaker bargaining position relative to the other party formulating
and imposing the fixed provision, although it is not the only factor
contributing to inequality of bargaining power.6 3 Courts have the
task then, as did the Illinois court in the case of the housing
shortage, of determining just how difficult it must be to find an
alternative before adhesion vitiates assent to the provision at issue.
It may be difficult in some cases to ascertain just how difficult it
would be for an employee to find alternatives to a standard form or
job transfer on which a preassignment might be based. The stan-
dard preassignment provisions with which he is confronted upon
hire may be prevalent throughout the industry in which he seeks
work, leaving him no effective options other than signing or seeking
work in another field.'" He may be without information that would
lead him to think he has any choice, as when his employer provides
him with orientation material for newly-hired personnel which is
designed to prompt signature of the form. For example, one orienta-
tion pamphlet states: "These are some of the reasons why our com-
pany, like practically all industries today, require you to assign your
inventions to the company as a condition of employment . . . (em-
phasis added)."'" Upon job transfer, assuming that the employee
realizes that the transfer might subject him to preassignment obli-
gations, he can do no more than protest or quit upon failure to
negotiate, possibly losing seniority advantages and encountering
equivalent standard form clauses elsewhere.'
3. Unreasonability of the Provision in Context
A party could conceivably assent freely to a contract provision
which is invariable and yet governs all transactions of a given kind.
If the provision were so appropriate that the party would expect it,
and indeed want it in such transactions, then it would represent,
though fixed and ubiquitous, what he had bargained for. There is,
then, a final criterion of adhesion: the party not formulating the
invariable term cannot reasonably expect or demand that it govern
the transaction which he seeks to enter. The court in Henningsen"
seemed to think that an automobile purchaser could rely on the
163. Cf. Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California, 48 So. CAL. L. REv. 1, 47-
48 (1975).
164. See note 40 and text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
165. Text quoted in O'MEARA, supra note 7, at 1.
166. See text accompanying notes 51-55 supra.
167. 32 N.J. 358, 401-02; 161 A.2d 68, 92-93 (1960). See Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith,
99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968).
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absence of defects which might render it dangerous to drive and that
therefore he would not be satisfied with a warranty disclaiming
liability for damages which might result from such defects. The
court in Steven v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York"' empha-
sized that the purchaser of an insurance policy, given the type of
coverage he was paying for, could not have anticipated the limita-
tion on liability which would have precluded the very protection he
eventually needed. A distinction, however, must be made between
the unreasonableness of a term in the immediate context of a partic-
ular transaction and in the larger context of judicial standards and
public policies.
Courts often move from a narrower transactional context to the
larger context of social policy.'" It can indeed be difficult to ascer-
tain just what any one party expected upon entering a particular
transaction. One commentator suggests that a court ask itself
whether the party, assuming hypothetically that he could have
freely negotiated the contract, would have reasonably assented to its
terms.' Another view is that, rather than second-guessing one
party's subjective expectations, a court ought to ask if the party
imposing the terms could have reasonably believed them to have
been understood and accepted."' If not, it then becomes important
to determine whether there are any standards by which the terms
at issue may be found reasonable or not. Such standards as statutes,
common-law doctrines, and underlying public policies, which indi-
cate what sort of terms any of a number of parties could have
legitimately demanded, would authorize enforcement.'12 Non-
168. 58 Cal. 2d 862, 868-70, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 176-77, 377 P.2d 284, 288-89 (1962). See also
Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 269-71 & n.4, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107-08, 419
P.2d 168, 171-72 (1966).
169. Since a contract provision might be more or less fixed as well as more or less the
adhering party's only alternative in a given transaction, the first two criteria outlined above
only help to determine a relative degree of adhesion. In close cases in which there may be
some difficult alternatives to invariable terms, courts often decide on the ultimate basis of
policy implications underlying the final criterion of adhesion. Thus, in O'Callaghan v. Walter
Beckwith Realty Co., 15 Ill. 2d 436, 155 N.E.2d 545 (1959), discussed in the text accompany-
ing note 161, supra, the majority and minority differed on whether there was sufficient
absence of alternatives to vitiate assent. But the minority deemed the clause in question
ultimately unacceptable in the light of changed social attitudes (O'Callaghan, 15 Ill. at 448-
49, 115 N.E.2d at 549-50).
170. Oldfather, Toward a Usable Method of Judicial Review of the Adhesion Contractor's
Lawmaking, 16 MAN. L. REV. 303, 398-99 (1968), where the author would ask, for instance,
whether the party imposing a contract could "justifiably shift the pick of his breach of a
fundamental obligation onto the adherent, i.e., the one-sidedness of a term becomes evidence
that a prudent negotiator would not have agreed to it.
171. Slawson, supra note 145, at 541-45.
172. Id. at 534, 550, 559-60.
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conformity with such standards, however, would justify invalidating
terms challenged as adhesive. Thus, in Henningsen, the court found
that legislative policy in establishing implied warranties did not
allow manufacturers to disclaim liability under such warranties.7 3
In Tunkl, the court concluded that society at large ought not be
subject to the risks incurred if public hospitals were to impose liabil-
ity release clauses.'"
It is possible to treat the problem of unreasonability in adjudicat-
ing preassignment claims by referring back to seminal common law
doctrines. Originally the courts, in their restrictive approach to such
claims, only found it reasonable to alienate creators' rights in the
products of mind for which there was a specific bargain."' Against
this standard of specificity, standard form provisions cast in blanket
terms would seem facially unreasonable to the extent they preassign
rights in all creations irrespective of the job for which the subject
employee is hired. Further, there is no reason for one to expect to
be suddenly subject to preassignment terms when transferred into
a creative or research department without significant change of re-
sponsibility and compensation. Ultimately, as explained earlier, the
standard of specificity is required by the need to maintain incen-
tives for creativity and disclosure for potential creators, that is, by
the policies promoted by constitutional provisions for securing crea-
tor's rights."'
C. Adhesion-Related Defects in Notice
The issues of adhesion and notice have been given separate treat-
ment in certain cases. For instance, in Tunkl, "I the California Su-
preme Court could only invalidate the hospital release clause for
adhesion in the face of a trial court finding that the adhering party
fully understood the effect of signing. In California State Automo-
bile Association Inter-Insurance Bureau v. Barrett Garages, Inc.,'l
the court found it unnecessary to reach the issue of adhesion where
it found that the exculpatory clause on a parking lot ticket was
insufficiently conspicuous to have effect. Although adhesion and
notice may seem analytically distinct in cases such as these, both
173. 32 N.J. 358, 387, 404, 161 A.2d 69, 85, 95 (1960).
174. 60 Cal. 2d 92, 104, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 40-41, 383 P.2d 441, 448-49 (1963).
175. See text accompanying notes 22-36 supra.
176. See text accompanying notes 125-40 supra.
177. 60 Cal. 2d 92, 95 n.1, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 34 n.1, 383 P.2d 441, 442 n.1 (1963).
178. 257 Cal. App. 2d 71, 79 n.1, 64 Cal. Rptr. 699, 704 n.1 (1967).
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defects in assent tend in practice to occur together."'
Where a party has little choice but to acquiesce in an invariable
contract, as in Henningsen or Tunkl, he has little incentive to take
note of the "fine print". This is especially the case when the party
attempting to impose the contractual language makes it inconspi-
cuous or difficult for a layman to understand or when that language
deals with contingencies hard to anticipate.'" Thus, although tradi-
tionally each party has the duty of carefully noting the terms to
which he assents, courts in adhesion situations tend to shift that
duty wholly onto the party formulating and imposing the terms in
question."' For instance, in Steven, there was evidence that the
insurance company, by selling its policy through a vending ma-
chine, did not afford the buyer an effective opportunity to inspect
all its terms, and that the form itself did not make these terms
obvious.'82 The court invalidated the contract on alternative
grounds of adhesion and inadequate notice, establishing the preced-
ent that such terms are unenforceable unless sufficiently conspicu-
ous that notice can be inferred.'
The core of the problem lies in the proof of knowing assent and
the extent to which a term, being unreasonable, no longer com-
mands such assent. As long as each party to a contract has the duty
to put himself on notice of its terms, a court can presume his know-
ing assent unless fraud, mistake or lack of capacity is shown.'' Once
a party is relieved of this duty on the grounds that he cannot easily
find an alternative to given terms, such a presumption need no
longer be entertained. The unreasonability also associated with
adhesion then comes into play, as in Steven where the court found
that the nature of the transaction did not alert the party to the
possible presence of the inconspicuous clause.' Unreasonability
179. Cf. id. at 79-80, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 705: the Court in Barrett avoided considering adhesion
as related to notice for the simple reason that it could refer directly to statutory notice
parameters for the size of type and placement of the challenged term.
180. See Slawson, supra note 145, at 540-41, 544-45.
181. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 386, 391-400, 161 A.2d 69,
84, 87-92 (1960), where the court starts out by stating that "we must keep in mind the general
principle that, in the absence of fraud, one who does not choose to read a contract before
signing it, cannot later relieve himself of its burdens," and then proceeds to shift the duty of
notice onto the party providing the form.
182. 58 Cal. 2d 862, 878-79, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 185-86, 377 P.2d 284, 297-98 (1962).
183. Id.
184. Cf. 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 607 (1963), (implying that a court may conclude that
each party legitimately presumes the other's knowing assent, unless one induces either the
other's failure to read or his mistake).
185. 58 Cal. 2d 862, 871-72, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 176-77, 377 P.2d 284, 288-89 (1962).
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stems not only from a party's expectations concerning whether a
given term should be operative in the immediate context of a trans-
action, but also from judicially adopted standards that allow the
party to refuse such a term. Thus, the Supreme Court in Fuentes
v. Shevin,'8 while noting possible adhesion, held that language fail-
ing to provide letter-perfect notice could not effectuate a wild
waiver of constitutionally fundamental rights to notice and hearing.
One explanation for imposing a high standard of notice on parties
using clauses that waive due process rights is that, in the larger
context of policies furthered in the exercise of these rights, the
waiver is presumptively unreasonable and, as such, not to be ex-
pected."I
In a preassignment context, such as the introductory hypothetical
depicts, lack of notice alone could be fatal. Until now, in applying
adhesion analysis, it has been assumed that the prospective em-
ployee knew of the existence of preassignment language in the stan-
dard form employment contract he was asked to sign.' Assent
would be defective (1) if such language can be neither negotiated
away nor modified, (2) if the employee has little practical alterna-
tive to signing the form as presented, and (3) if its provisions are
unreasonably broad or inappropriate relative to his other terms of
hire. But situations arise in which prospective employees are given
186. 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1971). The Supreme Court faults the fine print in question because
it "simply provided that upon default the seller 'may take back,' 'may retake' or 'may
repossess' merchandise." Yet such language is not unreasonably strained by interpreting it
to include the use of replevin proceedings. Finding inadequate notice in such circumstances
does become intelligible on the premise that the burden of providing notice shifts to the
provider of a possibly adhesive form. See National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375
U.S. 311, 326 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting) (waiver was not "an agreement cooly negotiated
and hammered out by equals"). See generally McCall, Due Process and Consumer Protec-
tion: Concepts and Realities in Procedure and Substance-Repossession and Adhesion Con-
tract Issues, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 383, 412-14, 422-25 (1974).
187. An alternative rationale, especially applied in constitutional cases, is that when cir-
cumstances make free and knowing waiver of crucial rights difficult to ascertain, the burden
of proving effective notice should be placed on the party asserting waiver. Thus in cases of
police custody, such as Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966), where a prisoner might
relinquish due process rights under pressures difficult to determine later, the prosecution has
an especially heavy burden of showing intelligent waiver. But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973) (no custody; waiver found effective). A commercial party might
acquiesce in language abandoning rights to litigate. However, where the "contractual nature"
of the language "was not obvious", the California Supreme Court, in Windsor Mills, Inc. v.
Collins & Aikman Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 987, 993-94, 101 Cal. Rptr. 347, 351 (1972), found
no waiver. Cf. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 608, 619 (1975)
(statutory prejudgment garnishment provisions violate due process though they are not terms
of an adhesion contract).
188. See text accompanying notes 6-10 supra.
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long standard form employment contracts with broad preassign-
ment language buried inside their fine print, and nothing about the
jobs they are about to take on or be shifted into would alert them
to the presence of such provisions.' In such a situation, just as upon
job transfer in which no change in duties, salary and authority indi-
cates that the legal effect of the transfer might be alienation of
creators' rights, the foregoing cases would warrant finding insuffi-
cient notice to allow any waiver of such rights.9 0
V. Strict Scrutiny
In the wealth and variety of contracts that are adjudicated, the
courts select certain types of claims as particularly needful of scru-
tiny for defects in assent. Contracts that might impair constitution-
ally based policies are especially subjected to strict review in this
regard.'"' In the instance of preassignments, the courts would pro-
189. See text accompanying notes 41-59, 63-67 and 74 supra.
190. A Fuentes-type argument must be distinguished from the present argument. Fuentes
turns on the Fourteenth Amendment which mandates courts to guard against state impair-
ment of individuals' exercise of certain rights. This article will not make a Fourteenth Amend-
ment argument for two reasons. First, the enforcement of a preassignment does not clearly
involve the state action needed to trigger judicial review under the Fourteenth Amendment.
But see § 1308, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 111(a) (1957). Were that proposed change in the patent
law put into effect, standard form preassignments might be subject to a Fourteenth Amend-
ment challenge. If the Patent Office were to recognize the standard form preassignment by
allowing the purported assignee to file directly for the patents, it could be compared to the
sheriff in Fuentes who enforced a provision in a standard conditional sales contract to replevin
property without notice and hearing. Cf. Misani v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 83 N.J.
Super. 1, 198 A.2d 791 (1964), rev'd, 210 A.2d 609, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 203 (1965) (employee
under preassignment excluded from patent by employer's having another file for it). Under
present law, 35 U.S.C. § 118 (1967), allows only the Patent Office to recognize the employer's
filing on behalf of individually named creators under preassignment in very limited circum-
stances. i
Second, rights that a preassignment impairs are not clearly incorporated under the Four-
teenth Amendment. But cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (HarlanJ., dissenting) (suggesting that
under Fourteenth Amendment due process, "'liberty' is not a series of isolated points pricked
out in terms" of discrete amendments or their penumbras, but rather a "rational continuum"
of rights given priority according to their nexus with broad social interests and, ultimately,
with "ordered liberty.") See note 103 supra, suggesting that creators' rights, if not clearly
fundamental themselves, are at least related to the fundamental interests in privacy and
freedom of thought.
191. See dictum in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 404, 161 A.2d 69,
95 (1960). Note the difference in the argument here which, under the Lear doctrine, finds the
policies at stake in the Authors and Inventors Clause rather than in any Fourteenth Amend-
ment language.
Also statutory solutions are possible. See Orkin, The Legal Rights for the Employed Inven-
tor: New Approaches to Old Problems (Part I), 56 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 648, 657 et seq. (1974);
Sutton & Williams, supra note 7. But see ABA Comm. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPY-
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tect constitutionally provided incentives to create and disclose by
developing a systematic approach to possible defects in assent.
Adhesion analysis has been proposed, and now the method for
thorough-going application of the analysis will be outlined.
A. A Method for Strict Scrutiny
In cases such as Rotary Lift and Jamesbury, "I courts refused to
give effect to over-reaching claims by reconstruing challenged preas-
signment provisions. This approach, however, is not systematic.
Judge Frank, dissenting in Siegelman v. Cunard White Star,'"
faulted "strained constructions of seemingly unambiguous lan-
guage" often used to alleviate the over-reaching consequences of
adhesion contracts. Indeed, courts would tax the limits of credibility
in construing preassignment claims away where employers rely on
preassignment language perfectly clear in its unconditional claims
on future creations. Moreover, Judge Frank further explained that
use of the various methods of construction can lead to erratic results
and provides little guidance in subsequent cases.' 4 Thus employers
can still use over-reaching preassignment language on the chance
that some courts will not construe away objectionable terms. The
only consistent remedy here would be clear legal rules that preclude
the use of such terms.9 5
Of course, it is always possible for employers to season their stan-
dard form employment contracts with recitals that due notice has
been taken of, and due consideration received for, their terms. They
can try to lure employees into transferring rights to creations by
including promises of bonuses for submitted ideas in forms that
provide for the unconditional releases of the creator's claims of right
on his ideas. For example, in Osborn v. Boeing Airplane Co.,'"1 the
employer attempted to use such a form to retain discretion to com-
RIGHTS, OPINIONS, No. 104, 53-54 (1973), noting continuing ABA disapproval and uncertainty
concerning pending legislation and concluding: "In view of the past study and action by the
Section, and the complexity and diversity of approaches to the question, it is believed that
further study is unlikely to be productive." Without discounting the possibility of effective
legislative remedy, this article merely posits that a flexible system of free contractual alloca-
tion of the rights involved can handle many of the complexities, and proposes judicial scrutiny
to assure free assent in particular contracts.
192. See text accompanying notes 63-67 supra.
193. 221 F.2d 189, 204-06 (2d Cir. 1955) (dissent).
194. Id. at 204-06, nn. 14-17. Cf. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960).
195. See Llewellyn, supra note 143 at 732-34.
196. 309 F.2d 99, 102-03 (9th Cir. 1962) (release too ambiguous to excuse employer from
compensating).
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pensate for submitted ideas, but the court held that such discretion
had to be limited to avoid unjust enrichment. One commentator has
proposed applying adhesion analysis to such releases, and indeed
the foregoing rationale for strict scrutiny of preassignments would
also apply to whatever other forms or instruments might be used as
bases for over-reaching claims on creators' rights.' More broadly,
scrutiny for adhesion must look beyond all such forms to ascertain
whether the creator, in the concrete conditions endemic to in-
dustrial hiring of artistic and technical manpower, freely assented
to a conveyance of his rights. At the threshold of inquiry, a court
ought to determine whether the initial criteria of adhesion are pres-
ent. Relevant questions for this initial determination would be:""
Were the preassignment provisions or terms of hire upon which a
preassignment claim is based, invariable? and What alternatives to
such terms did the employee have immediately available to him?
It is here proposed that if a preassignment is contained in a standard
form employment contract or based on unilateral job transfer, cer-
tain presumptions arise in favor of adhesion.'" An employee not
being hired specifically to create would regard the clause as inap-
plicable to him and perceive no concession in signing it, as against
not signing it and forgoing a job. An employee who might have had
options upon accepting general terms of hire cannot be assumed to
have any further option when following a directive to assist in crea-
tive or research work. Thus, where the standard form is imposed as
a condition of employment, or the directive to change job function
could not have been negotiated, such terms should be considered
until proven otherwise to have been imposed in the absence of other
alternatives.2 00
197. 2 NIMMER, supra note 11, at 640.1, n.112.
198. See text accompanying notes 154-66 supra.
199. Given possible adhesion, some courts suggest that the form provider should be es-
topped from introducing extrinsic evidence to show that the agreement he alleges was actually
bargained for and reasonable in context. See Tahoe National Bank v. Phillips, 4 Cal. 3d 11,
20, 92 Cal. Rptr. 704, 711, 480 P.2d 320, 327 (1971) (exclusion of evidence that standard form
promise not to encumber was meant as mortgage agreement). The method proposed for
scrutiny would place on the form provider only the burden of proving by such extrinsic
evidence that the form was reasonable in context. For instance, an employer could show that,
in certain circumstances such as "think-tank" situations where the employee is given total
freedom to innovate in a variety of fields, a blanket preassignment of all his products of mind
was bargained for and appropriate. For a description of one think-tank situation and the
extraordinary freedom it gave its employees, see S. BRAND, 11 CYBERNETIC FRONTIERS 39 et seq.
(1974).
200. This approach coincides with the equitable theory that employment contracts should
provide a basis for injunctive relief only where the services in question are unique. See D.
DoBBS, REMEDIES 935 (1973). A creator of unique talent is more likely than an ordinary
40 [Vol. 2
CREATORS' RIGHTS
If alternatives thus appear absent, the court should then ask
whether the final criterion of adhesion, unreasonability, applies.""
Also, independent of the issue of alternatives, where a term is so
unreasonable that its context does not alert a possibly adhering
party to its presence or significance, it may be ineffective for lack
of notice.2 02 A court should then ask in each particular case whether
the claimed preassignment was reasonable in the immediate trans-
action in which it was imposed. The seminal cases adopt the stan-
dard that only terms of hire to create specifically covered products
of mind may reasonably provide a basis for enforcing a preassign-
ment of rights in such products.20 A clause couched in blanket terms
should be presumed unreasonable in that it lacks such specificity:
an employee hired in a non-creative capacity has no reason to expect
that such provisions apply to him. 04 Also, if he initially worked
under general terms of hire to be later shifted into research-related
work, these general terms would not specifically alert him to a possi-
ble preassignment.20o In short, a party asserting a preassignment on
the basis of a form cast in blanket terms or mere job transfer would
have the burden of showing both reasonability and actual notice.
Specific terms of hire to create and tailored preassignments would
not trigger the foregoing presumptions. Still an employee laboring
under such terms and express provisions, rather than under the
suspect blanket form, ought to be allowed to plead and prove adhe-
sion.2 06 He could, for instance, offer to prove the prevalence of preas-
employee to bargain for a tailored preassignment which, unlike the adhesive terms imposed
on the latter, ought to be enforcible. See text accompanying notes 21-22 and 62 supra.
201. See text accompanying notes 167-76 supra.
202. See text accompanying notes 177-90 supra.
203. See text accompanying notes 22-36 supra.
204. There is no doubt that imposing a broadly termed standard form on a large number
of transactions reduces the costs of administering these transactions. Thus the blanket stan-
dard form preassignment seems to present a certain advantage to the employer who, in
calculating business risks, desires a reliable allocation of rights in his employees' creations.
Strict scrutiny for adhesion in the use of such terms, however, involves no dispute with an
employer who, paying creative personnel to participate in specific or even broad artistic or
scientific projects, has claims on those creations which foreseeably result from the projects.
See notes 199 and 200 supra.
205. Once again the issue is whether the employee has any claim on creations not included
in a negotiated job function or on any product of mind created under general terms of hire.
Since the employer cannot count on such creations outside of such job functions from non-
creative personnel, he cannot argue that he needs to tie rights thereto to amorphous job titles.
206. The issue of fact would be different but related to monopoly questions. It would entail
determining, not an employer's power to set prices in a given field, but to fix terms of
employment for categories of trained manpower. For instance, the studio system enabled
certain corporations to exercise monopoly control over creation in the movie industry. See
note 39 supra. With the antitrust case United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S.
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signment provisions in the industry where he seeks work or, when
faced with a directive to do research under an express or implied
preassignment, the absence of alternatives elsewhere. Another fac-
tor for judicial consideration is the extent to which the employer
claiming under a preassignment has a monopoly on the facilities
indispensable to creation in a particular field.2 07 In that situation,
whatever the employer's terms of hire, anyone who sought to create
in that field would have little choice but to accept the terms in order
to have access to these facilities.
The use of the proper presumptions thus provides the courts with
an effective method for filtering claims of preassignment that are
not based on effective assent. It also allows the courts to hear evi-
dence which would supplement the presumptions in the particular
cases where the preassignment assented to appears to have been
negotiated. Finally, it requires parties making preassignment
claims to prove assent where the presumptions and supplementary
evidence allow inference of its absence.
B. Equitably Reallocating Creators' Rights
Invalidating a preassignment for adhesion does not yet dispose of
the question: How should creators' rights be allocated in the cases
at hand?"8 To this point the present analysis has focused on the
contractual allocation of a creator's legally protected interests but
131 (1948), the studio system began to lose its hold on the industry, and creators began to
negotiate collectively their terms of hire. See note 10 supra. In Bernstein v. Universal Pic-
tures, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd, 517 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1975), however,
the composers and lyricists union sued as a class the media employers, alleging industry-wide
refusal to renegotiate standard copyright preassignment terms. The truth of this allegation,
independent of its relevance in an antitrust suit, would bear on the following question: Could
an individual composer, once union terms had lapsed, freely bargain for copyrights? See note
10 supra.
207. Again monopoly questions are relevant. Where a firm dominates a creative or technol-
ogically intense field, its terms of hire should be scrutinized. See Stedman, The Employed
Inventor, The Public Interest, and Horse and Buggy Law in the Space Age, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1, 19 (1970), concerning the general tendency of the large corporations to monopolize research
facilities and to possess market power necessary to exploit inventions. See text accompanying
notes 38-39 supra. See Wall Street Journal, Jan. 22, 1975, at 1, col. 4, describing an attempt
by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to provide independent inventors with alterna-
tive research facilities outside the corporate system.
208. Constitutional provisions reserving such rights to individual creators might support
the proposition that, absent a valid contract, rights should vest in such creator. But no
constitutionally based doctrine of preemption has been laid down to guide decisions in these
cases, although recent decisions in state courts follow federal decisions which in turn do not
refer back to state law. See Koenig, The Shop Right-Time for Limitation, 49 J. PAT. OFF.
SocY 658, 663-64 (1967).
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has yet to consider the employer's equitable claims. Traditionally,
where the employee creates on his employer's time or premises, the
latter has a claim in a free license known as a "shop right" to use
and profit from the creation.'"' Recent cases and commentary sug-
gest narrowing the situations in which shop rights are granted to
those in which the employer's capital investments, in the form of
know-how and facilities, substantially contributed to the creation.'",
In Materese v. Moore-McCormack Lines,2'" absent such contribu-
tion, the employer had to disgorge monies saved through the unau-
thorized use of a device which an immigrant dock worker had in-
vented on his own. Courts have also found that, although an em-
ployer's time and facilities might have been used in creating, such
use was too negligible to warrant a license for the free use of the
creation.2 12 Thus, absent valid contractual allocation of creators'
rights, a court ought to balance the employer's contributions to
creation against the employee's contributions before awarding the
former any share in the resulting product of mind.
An employer might claim, however, that his own "intellectual
property" was indispensable to his employee's creating any further
products of mind. For instance, where the employer exercises his
right to control disclosure of know-how, he could sue an employee
who disclosed an invention which incorporated his know-how in an
obvious fashion. 213 Such a claim would follow the analogy of deriva-
tive copyrights or improvement patents. There the creator who elab-
orates on a previously copyrighted work or patented invention may
not use and profit from his derivative product without obtaining a
license from the original copyright or patent holder.21' As just sug-
gested, shop rights should only be granted upon a showing of use of
an employer's capital resources indispensable to creation. Shop
rights granted upon use of an employer's protectible know-how
might be considered as a set-off against the employer's claims in
209. See Bishop, supra note 16, at 44-50.
210. See Koenig, The Shop Right-Time for Limitation, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 658, 670-74
(1967). But see Morris, Patent Rights in an Employee's Invention: The American Shop Right
Rule and the English View, 75 LAW Q. REV. 483, 494-96 (1959).
211. 158 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946).
212. See, e.g., Gemco Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Henderson, 151 Ohio St. 95, 84 N.E.2d
596 (1949) (exclusive use of employee's time and material in invention); Aero Bolt & Screw
Co. v. Isia, 180 Cal. App. 2d 728, 736-39, 5 Cal. Rptr. 53 (1960) (use of employer's drafting
board, specifications book, spare parts, etc., insufficient basis for shop right claim).
213. This assumes that appropriation or disclosure of the secrets violated the employee's
contractual or fiduciary duties to the employer. See Nash, supra note 98, at 296-98.
214. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 11, at Ch. 3; P. Rosenberg, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 12,
31 (1975).
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such know-how. A court could go further in such circumstances: it
could enjoin the use of the know-how altogether or allow the creator
to use his employer's secrets but grant the latter a share in profits
from such use. t5 Thus, where strict scrutiny invalidates a preassign-
ment, an employer may still pursue a claim for more than a free
license in the creation in question, if his own protectible know-how
was incorporated into the creation.
While it is true that a court may tailor various remedies to allow
a creator to use his product with trade secrets it incorporates, em-
ployers also attempt to resolve this problem ahead of time by cou-
pling blanket preassignments with promises not to disclose such
secrets.2 1 1 Thus, in the event an employee creates, litigation over the
employer's share in the resulting product of mind need not separate
out novel from trade secret elements in the product, for if both
preassignment and nondisclosure terms are valid, they will cover
the whole product. But, in Motorola, Inc. v. Fairchild Camera and
Instrument Corp., '2 the court found that, absent terms specifying
the trade secrets employees were to keep confidential, a non-
disclosure agreement was too broad to be enforceable. Under Lear
such overbreadth was held suspect. If objectionable in nondisclosure
agreements, a fortiori such broad terms are unreasonable in preas-
signments, whether designed as supplementary devices to protect
trade secrets or to cash in on collateral creations.218 Still an em-
ployer, whom strict scrutiny prevents from using a blanket preas-
signment to cover trade secrets arguably incorporated in an em-
ployee's creation, may still use other appropriate agreements to
protect such secrets.
Conclusion
Modern industry makes widespread use of standard form blanket
preassignments, and employees often find themselves subject to like
terms purportedly based on transfers into research and develop-
ment. Whether or not imposed "as express terms upon hire or im-
plied" from subsequent job functions, such terms often may not be
varied through negotiation, and sometimes dominate entire indus-
215. Preemption principles might bar injunctions for trade secret use where Congress, in
implementing constitutional policies, disallowed such drastic remedies for infringement of
federal rights. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 496-99 (1974) (Douglas, J.
dissenting).
217. See O'MEARA, supra note 7, at Ch. 4, concerning agreement provisions.
218. 366 F. Supp. 1173, 1185-86 (D. Ariz. 1973).
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tries or fields of creative and inventive endeavor. As such, they allow
an employee little alternative but acquiescence and are susceptible
of application to him without any reasonable relation to the package
of salary and responsibilities which he initially bargained for. Fur-
ther, they contravene the policies behind state and federal protec-
tion of creators' rights and, most crucially, undercut the constitu-
tional rationale for reserving such rights to individuals to encourage
them to create and disclose their products of mind. Finally, strict
scrutiny of preassignments would not be counter-productive for the
double goal of encouraging creation and disclosure, but would re-
quire only that contracts allocating rights in products of mind be
more closely tailored. It is therefore submitted that, prior to enforc-
ing any claimed preassignment of such rights, courts scrutinize the
basis of such claims for adhesion and related defects in notice,
thereby allowing eventual creators a reasonable alternative in nego-
tiating the allocation of their rights.

